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Abstract

The presidency of Barack Obama presents us with a paradox, in that it was both a policy
success and a political failure, two states that seemingly contradict with one another. His
presidency is considered a policy success due to its ability to successfully pass many key pieces
of legislation, despite several challenges. On the other hand, Obama’s presidency is also
considered a political failure primarily due to the election of Donald J. Trump, someone who is
not an ally to the Obama administration and has worked to undo Obama’s accomplishments as
president in nearly every area. Today, Obama’s legacy as president continues to play a large
impact on American politics given the high stakes nature of the current 2020 presidential election
and the strong connection that both candidates running has with President Obama. As a result,
examining Obama’s presidency and the impact it left behind is more important than ever. This
research takes into consideration the large amount of literature on the paradox and evaluates
several arguments by a variety of authors in four different areas of the Obama presidency to
determine the strength of these arguments.
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Chapter One: Introduction
The Obama Paradox
Many political scientists and experts have sought to present varying arguments and
explanations of the Obama paradox. The Obama paradox is a term that encapsulates a unique
phenomenon of the Obama presidency, in which it is seen as a policy success and a political
failure at the same time. The Obama presidency is seen as a policy success because of its ability
to pass groundbreaking pieces of legislation, such as the Affordable Care Act, despite many
obstacles. These obstacles include a unified obstructionist GOP in Congress, the losses suffered
by the Democratic Party during the 2010 midterm elections (along with the subsequent gains in
the same election by the GOP), an increase in racial resentment and polarizing racial attitudes
towards African-Americans, and the rise of an opposition movement, the Tea Party, among other
obstacles. The Obama administration was also able to take the steps necessary to cut short the
financial crisis, keep the U.S. auto industry alive, and reform education, immigration, the
environment, and LGBTQ+ rights, to name a few areas, along with many other achievements.
Considering the challenges facing the Obama administration, they can definitively be described
as a policy success for their impressive policy accomplishments.
At the same time, despite being a policy success, the Obama administration is seen as a
political failure because of its inability to keep together a Democratic coalition in Congress, the
growth of the GOP, declining approval ratings during Obama’s early presidency, and the fact
that Obama’s presidency was succeeded by a Republican candidate, Donald J. Trump, who
promised to undo Obama’s legacy rather than continue it. During the mid-term election of 2010,
the Democratic Party sustained heavy losses in the House of Representatives and the Senate,
while the GOP gained many seats in both chambers, enough to take control of the House of
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Representatives, and make large gains in state elections and in the Senate. Additionally, in
Congress, Republicans were mostly unified in their goal to totally obstruct the Obama White
House and the Democratic Party. On the other hand, the Democratic coalition in Congress was
divided by ideological differences and conflicts of interest that were further deepened by
regional divisions.
During Obama’s early presidency, the economy was slow, and unemployment remained
high. This, coupled with the belief that the Obama administration had failed to enact great
change, led many of Obama’s opponents and supporters to consider his early presidency a
failure, contributing to a decline in the president’s approval ratings. According to a Gallup poll
conducted during Obama’s first term in office in 2010, only 52% of Americans thought that
Obama was doing a good job at protecting the nation’s environment. In two other areas,
improving the nation’s energy policy and making America prosperous, approval was even lower,
at 43% and 38% respectively (Jones, “Obama Not Meeting”). Most of the public was not well
informed on the policy achievements of the Obama administration, due to presidential
communication decisions, the complexity of some of the administration’s policies, and the
fractured media landscape. Many of Obama’s supporters had high hopes for the president and the
change he could bring to American politics but were disappointed when they felt that the
president fell short of their expectations.
Obama’s policies had enacted significant change but did so in ways that were discrete
and hard to observe by the public. For example, Obama’s stimulus program distributed its tax
cuts through gradual amounts, rather than a lump sum, and most people failed to notice it.
Ultimately, a failure to effectively convey and publicize their accomplishments to the public in a
highly visible way hindered the Obama administration from gaining the public support they
2

desired. The Obama administration also failed to institutionalize Obama’s legacy and protect it
from being dismantled by succeeding administrations. The presidential election of 2016 resulted
in the victory of Republican Party candidate, Donald J. Trump, who attacked Obama and his
administration throughout his campaign. Trump also propagated the birther conspiracy, which
alleged that Obama was not born in the U.S, and promised that, once elected, he would
immediately repeal Obamacare and dismantle other programs and legislation from the Obama
administration, such as DACA (the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program). The
outcome of the 2016 presidential election signified a continuation of the Obama paradox, though
this was slightly diminished by the fact that Hillary Clinton won the popular vote. This was
significant because Hillary Clinton, the Democratic Party candidate, signified a continuation and
protection of the Obama legacy. On the other hand, Donald Trump, the Republican Party
candidate, signified the opposite: the destruction of the Obama legacy and the start of a new
Republican era.
Keeping with his campaign promises, Donald Trump began to immediately work to undo
the policies of his predecessor when he came into office. He started with an executive order that
directed federal agencies to use their powers to dismantle the Affordable Care Act as much as
possible. According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the Trump administration has
significantly cut funding on advertising and outreach efforts, including groups that help
consumers enroll in ACA. The Trump administration has also created several administrative
obstacles for consumers, such as shortening open enrollment and creating new special enrollment
periods, making it more difficult to enroll in or maintain marketplace coverage. By approving
eligibility restrictions that reduce the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid, encouraging states to
weaken the ACA’s protections, and backing a lawsuit that aims to invalidate the ACA in its
3

entirety, the Trump administration has also reduced the ACA’s coverage (Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities, “Sabotage Watch: Tracking Efforts”). Finally, President Trump passed the Tax
Cut and Reform Bill, which did away with an essential part of Obamacare: the individual
mandate, which required all Americans to have health insurance or else pay a penalty.
Additionally, on trade and foreign policies, President Trump has upended several of the
Obama administration’s actions through his ‘America First’ approach. On January 23, 2017,
President Trump signed an executive order which officially withdrew the U.S. from the TransPacific Partnership, a free-trade deal that was negotiated during the Obama presidency. A few
months later, Trump undid the Obama administration’s attempts at building relations with Cuba
by reinstating travel and trade restrictions with the island nation. On May 8, 2018, President
Trump announced that the U.S. would be withdrawing from the Iran Nuclear Agreement, which
was reached in 2015 under the Obama administration. In its place, Trump stated that the U.S.
would be reinstating sanctions on Iran. Then, on January 28, 2020, Trump announced his peace
plan for Israel and Palestine with Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. This plan favors
Israel by allowing Israeli settlements in Palestine, breaking with the long-standing U.S. position
on the subject held by Obama and other preceding presidents (Council on Foreign Relations,
“Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments”).
The Trump administration has also dismantled much of the Obama administration’s
climate change policies. The Clean Power Plan, the crown jewel of Obama’s climate change
legacy, was an executive order that sought to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. The Trump
administration terminated the Clean Power Plan and replaced it with the much weaker
Affordable Clean Energy rule. President Trump also withdrew the U.S. from the Paris Climate
Accord, a global plan to fight climate change that was adopted under the Obama administration,
4

and approved the development of the Keystone XL Pipeline project through an executive order.
The Keystone XL Pipeline transports tar sand oil, one of the dirtiest fossil fuels, from Canada to
U.S refineries. It was originally rejected by the Obama administration. The pipeline has sparked
protests and controversy because it would increase our reliance on dirty energy and could
threaten public health and the ecosystem (Albeck-Ripka et al., “The Trump Administration”).
The Trump administration has also loosened regulations that the Obama administration passed to
increase the safety of offshore drilling following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the
Gulf of Mexico.
In the area of environmental regulations, the Trump administration has overturned flood
standards and the environmental review process for federal infrastructure projects. Both of these
Obama administration policies were replaced by the Trump administration’s one federal decision
policy, in which a single leading federal agency oversees a project with significantly shorter
deadlines. The Trump administration’s attacks on the Obama administration’s regulations are for
the purpose of permitting infrastructure projects to start faster and speed up the progress of
existing infrastructure projects. The Interior Department, under President Trump’s direction, has
rescinded many Obama-era climate change and conservation policies under this claim, stating
that the Obama administration’s policies burdened development (Albeck-Ripka et al., “The
Trump Administration”).
The Trump administration has also rolled back the Obama administration’s fuel economy
standard, which served to make cars more environmentally friendly by reducing carbon dioxide
emissions and replaced it with a lower fuel economy standard which would increase carbon
dioxide emissions. The Endangered Species Act is yet another area where the Trump
administration has sought to undo the Obama administration’s efforts. Obama overturned the
5

Bush administration’s regulation, which sought to minimize the role of scientists and wildlife
conservation experts on projects that could possibly affect endangered species. The Obama
administration pledged to increase the role of scientists in the Endangered Species Act. On the
other hand, the Trump administration has weakened the Endangered Species Act considerably by
allowing for it to become easier to remove an endangered species from the endangered list and
weakening current protections for endangered species (Albeck-Ripka et al., “The Trump
Administration”).
In the area of justice reform, the Obama administration took several steps to combat
injustices in America, such as weakening sentencing laws that imposed racially charged
sentences and reducing the sentences of those charged with petty drug offenses (The Editorial
Board, “Donald Trump and the Undoing”). However, the Trump administration has aggressively
charged nonviolent drug offenders, even in states that have legalized the sale and usage of
marijuana. This marks a reversal of the Obama administration’s discouragement of federal
marijuana prosecutions. Under the Trump administration, the Justice Department has reduced
investigations into incidents of police brutality in comparison to the Obama administration and
has returned to using private, for-profit prisons, which encourages increased incarceration (The
Editorial Board, “Donald Trump and the Undoing”).
Another area of contention between the two administrations is their remarkably different
approaches towards student debt relief and nutritional standards for schools across the nation.
The Obama administration set several regulations and standards, including generous loan
forgiveness programs, aimed at protecting college students from predatory practices by for-profit
colleges and providing debt relief to students who took out loans to support their college
educations. Education Secretary Betsy DeVos, a member of the Trump administration, however,
6

has worked to overturn these regulations and make it more difficult for students who have been
misled by colleges to have their debt relieved (Stratford, “Trump backs DeVos plan”). DeVos’
regulations make it more difficult for students who have been misled by colleges to have their
debt relieved. President Trump has sided with DeVos by vetoing legislation that would block her
proposed regulation.
Additionally, during the Obama administration, First Lady Michelle Obama took up the
cause of combatting obesity in American school children. She promoted the practice of daily
exercise among children with her “Let’s Move!” campaign, and the importance of healthy eating
at home and in school lunches. Additionally, Michelle Obama worked on the Healthy, HungerFree Kids Act, which became law under the Obama administration and made cafeteria school
lunches across the nation healthier, more nutritious, and available to all students. However, the
Trump administration and the U.S. Department of Agriculture have weakened the nutritional
standards school food must comply to. The USDA announced on January 17, 2020, that they
would relax the standards of what constitutes as a fruit and a vegetable. The Trump
administration will also allow schools to provide less vegetables and fruits and more fast food to
students (Reiley, “USDA proposes changing school menus”).
On tax policy, the Obama administration sought to increase tax rates on the wealthiest
Americans, while the Trump administration pushed for tax cuts that favor the wealthy. In 2013,
the top 0.1% of Americans paid $50 billion more in taxes than they would have under preexisting rules due to a 28% increase in their tax rates (Somanader, “Here’s What President
Obama”). The Trump administration’s tax cut, on the other hand, has benefited the wealthiest
20% of Americans as well as large corporations, while failing to provide the kind of permanent
economic growth that President Trump initially promised (Horsley, “After 2 Years, Trump Tax
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Cuts”). The Obama administration also expanded tax credits and tax cuts for millions of working
and middle-class families and increased tax rates on high-income Americans through the Child
Tax Credit, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the American Opportunity Tax Credit.
The financial crisis Obama encountered while he was in office led the Obama
administration to set up several financial regulations in order to prevent another financial crisis in
the future. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was passed in
2010 and created new government agencies to oversee the financial system. It has been
significantly rollbacked by the Trump administration through the Economic Growth, Regulatory
Relief and Consumer Protection Act, which eases restrictions on small and medium-sized banks
(Pramuk, “Trump signs the biggest rollback”). Additionally, under the Obama administration,
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which aimed to hold consumer financial markets
accountable, was created. However, under the Trump Administration, the C.F.P.B. has been
undermined by its new acting director, Mick Mulvaney, who was installed by President Trump
(Confessore, “Mick Mulvaney’s Master Class”). Mulvaney began to dismantle the bureau,
starting with several appointments. Mulvaney appointed a policy associate director for each
senior career official and hired Brian Johnson, who has openly opposed the bureau, to lead the
policy associate directors. Mulvaney also enacted a hiring freeze at the C.F.P.B., put cases on
hold, and failed to even request a budget for the bureau (Confessore, “Mick Mulvaney’s Master
Class”).
In 2012, Obama passed the immigration policy, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA). The program helped many young immigrants avoid getting deported. Early into his
presidency, President Trump announced his intention to overturn DACA (Gamboa, “What is
DACA?”). Shortly after this announcement, the administration ceased to accept applications as
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well as renewals for DACA until a court order forced them to accept DACA renewals again
(Gamboa, “What is DACA?”). The Trump administration has created fear among many
immigrants with its strong anti-immigration rhetoric and actions. This has also contributed to a
decline in the effectiveness of DACA. While the program has not been repealed as of yet, the
Trump administration continues to weaken DACA and push for the Supreme Court to repeal the
immigration program in its entirety.
In office, President Obama relied upon his executive powers to carry out many of his
accomplishments. While his usage of executive power succeeded in bypassing the obstructive
GOP in Congress and passing legislation that would have otherwise faced difficulty in getting
passed, it had the detriment of making it far easier for succeeding presidents, such as Trump, to
dismantle the Obama legacy and its accomplishments.
Importance of the Obama Paradox
The unique nature of the Obama paradox has shifted the political playing field once
more. Understanding this paradox, and the factors that contributed to it, then, is of high
importance to also understanding the current state of both the Democratic and Republican Party
and American politics as a whole. Considering the fact that American party politics touches upon
general societal concepts such as economics, race, gender, and sexuality, it is crucial to explore
abnormalities such as the paradox of the Obama administration to provide insight into our nation.
The Obama paradox also sheds light on broader issues, such as how the public perceives the
president, the limits of the presidency, voting behaviors, and how political polarization has
affected the American political landscape.
Brief Literature Review
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The Obama paradox has been a topic of study for many scholars. Thus, there has been an
extensive amount of literature regarding specific aspects of the Obama paradox. While Chapter
Two of this thesis offers an in-depth, substantive literature review of these works, this section
serves to briefly outline the arguments and works that will be presented further on.
Kevin M. Kruse’s and Julian E. Zelizer’s (2019) book, “Fault Lines: A History of the
United States since 1974,” establishes a history of the fault lines of division in America, and how
they have continued to divide the American people today. Through an analysis of three different
periods of time in American history, and the formative events that led to the continuation and
exacerbation of these fault lines, Kruse and Zelizer come to the conclusion that the Obama
administration simply could not overcome the vast historical forces present in order to create
bipartisanship, and that these divisive forces prevail under the current president, Donald J.
Trump.
Doug McAdam and Karina Kloos (2014) in their book, “Deeply Divided: Racial Politics
and Social Movements in Post-War America,” focus on social movement dynamics and their
formative role in the development of the Republican and Democratic party. McAdam and Kloos
believe that while the general public has remained fairly centrist, social movement dynamics has
shifted the political elite off-center. The book goes through three central movements: the civil
rights movement, the Republican Party’s southern strategy, and the 1970’s political party
reforms. Similarly to Kruse and Zelizer, McAdam and Kloos believe that the Obama
administration could not ease the extreme partisanship in Congress. However, unlike Kruse and
Zelizer, McAdam and Kloos also explore the effect of the Tea Party, which they argue
contributes a significant role in the Obama administration’s political failure.
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In “Personality and Politics: Obama For and Against Himself,” Stephen J. Wayne (2013)
analyzes interviews, speeches, and books written by Obama, as well as tales from his close
friends and family, in order to draw assumptions about his character and personality, which
contribute to his explanation of the paradox. Wayne gives five reasons for why he believes
Obama failed politically despite being a policy success: external factors and events, muddled
communications, biased news media coverage, a shift in the public perception of Obama’s
personal attributes, and a change in Obama’s plans due to realities of the office.
In “Overreach: Leadership in the Obama Presidency,” George C. Edwards III uses the
broad concept of ‘overreach’ in order to define what he believes are the Obama administration’s
mistakes and the reason why they did not achieve the policy success they sought. Edwards III
believes that Obama had a far too ambitious liberal agenda and did not adequately exploit the
existing opportunities he had. Additionally, Edwards III believes that Obama ignored public
opinion by pursuing politically unpopular policies early into his presidency, depleting him of his
political capital.
In her book, “Obama and America’s Political Future,” political scientist Theda Skocpol’s
comprehensive explanation of the Obama paradox is made up of three parts: a comparison
between the Obama administration and the F.D.R. administration and their opportunities in
constructing a New Deal, an examination of the Tea Party movement and their role in pushing
the Republican Party to the far right, and finally, a reflection on the future of American politics
and the then upcoming 2012 presidential election. Skocpol states throughout her book that the
Obama administration is a policy success, simply for the amount of initiatives and campaign
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promises they were able to fulfill. However, there were many factors that led to the Obama
administration’s political failures.
Skocpol explains that F.D.R. entered a drastically different presidency and political and
social climate than Obama did. Obama was offered little to none of the same opportunities that
permitted F.D.R. to construct the New Deal. She also points at the growing Tea Party movement
as an example of the political failures of the Obama administration. The mobilization of Tea
Party members, who strongly oppose the Obama administration and its policies, has pulled the
Republican Party towards the far right, increased Republican obstructionism against the Obama
administration. The Tea Party has impacted election outcomes at all levels and has the potential
to do so again. Finally, Skocpol offers a few reflections on the state of American politics.
Namely, she believes that the Tea Party will continue to pull the Republican Party right, and that
there is a good chance that the Republican Party will continue to hold its power in Congress,
which indicates a need for President Obama to institutionalize and preserve his legacy from
Republicans, backed by Tea Party members, who wish to destroy it.
Paul Krugman, an economist who has been covering the Obama administration’s
economic policy since the beginning of his administration in the media, advances the argument
that the Obama paradox is really defined by another paradox. This paradox is the fact that
Republicans claim that Obama’s economic policies are failures, while also demanding the
creation of new jobs in the country. Krugman considers these two claims together as paradoxical
since Republicans prevented Obama from establishing and passing any of his policies, even
those that could bring about the changes that Republicans claim that they want.
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“The Presidency of Barack Obama: A First Historical Assessment,” is a book partially
written and edited by prominent political scientist, Julian E. Zelizer, along with contributors Eric
Rauchway, Paul Starr, Meg Jacobs, Risa Goluboff, Richard Schragger, Timothy Stewart-Winter,
Jonathan Zimmerman, Peniel E. Joseph, Thomas J. Sugrue, Matthew D. Lassiter, Sarah R.
Coleman, Jeremi Suri, Kathryn Olmsted, Jacob Dlamini, Michael Kazin, and Gary Gerstle
(2018). Each contributor discusses a specific policy area of the Obama administration, but what
ties together the entire book is a focus on the Trump administration and what it means for the
preservation of the Obama administration’s policy legacy. The large consensus is that the Obama
administration’s legacy is most likely to be pushed back, at least partially, in most areas, under
President Trump.
Overview of Chapters
Chapter One begins by introducing the concept of the Obama paradox, its importance, the
body of literature on it, and provide an overview and methodology for the thesis. Chapter Two is
a substantive literature review that gives more of an in-depth analysis of each work of literature
than the brief summaries listed above, while also separating each work into three categories
(historical forces, psychological forces, and structural forces) and briefly comparing the works in
each of these categories to one another. Chapter Three covers the economic policy of the Obama
administration, particularly the policies of TARP and the stimulus. Chapter Four discusses the
auto bailout enacted under the Obama administration. It includes several case studies of states
that were severely impacted by the auto bailout, due to a large amount of workers depending on
jobs from the auto industry, and how they voted in the 2012 presidential election. Chapter Five
seeks to discuss Obamacare and how racial resentment played a role in how the public perceived
it, and Chapter Six turns to psychological factors in evaluating Obama’s role as a party leader, as
13

well as the psychological and structural factors that either helped or hindered his abilities.
Chapter Seven concludes this thesis with an overview, final thoughts, and related areas of
potential further study.
Methodology
The methodology for my thesis will be an extended literature review that tests Skocpol’s
argument, advanced in her book, “Obama and America’s Future,” against alternative
explanations for the Obama paradox found in the books discussed in the literature review of this
thesis. There are four concepts of the Obama administration that both Skocpol and the other
arguments will be tested against : economic policy, the auto bailout, Obamacare, and Obama’s
capability as a party leader.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
Skocpol’s Argument
Political scientist Theda Skocpol’s (2012) book, “Obama and America’s Political
Future,” presents a comprehensive argument on the Obama paradox that is flexible enough to
discuss the historical, psychological, and structural aspects of the Obama presidency, and thus, is
addressed in its own section. Skocpol begins by explaining that many of Obama’s supporters
anticipated that the president would enact change through a new ‘New Deal,’ and were
disappointed with his early presidency. With the severe unpopularity of Obama’s predecessor,
George W. Bush, and the reduction of the presence and numbers of the Republican Party,
conditions seemed perfect for the new Obama administration to step in. Yet, Obama’s popularity
and approval ratings quickly dropped from their post-election high and the Republican Party,
instead of becoming further weakened as many predicted, began gaining more control as it
extended and grew out its base.
Skocpol argues that, unlike what most of the public believed, Obama did not fail to
deliver the change he promised. In fact, the Obama administration was able to fashion significant
legislation and reform but received little political payoff for it. To the public, the economy and
the unemployment rate was still the same as it was before Obama, and the Obama presidency
was deemed a disappointment early on. Skocpol offers several reasons for the Obama paradox.
Obama was thrown into the presidency during a financial and economic meltdown. Ultimately,
he did the best he could, but the way he dealt with this crisis seemed like a betrayal to ‘Main
Street’ by the public. Additionally, creating and passing legislation was a slow and messy
bargaining process that made many people feel as if nothing was happening. The achievements
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of the Obama administration were largely invisible to his supporters, yet visible enough to be
threatening to his opponents.
This leads into Skocpol’s comparison of the Obama administration and the F.D.R.
administration, and her argument that the Obama administration was unable to establish a new
“New Deal” because the two administrations operated under entirely different conditions and
environments, contrary to popular belief. To begin with, F.D.R. came into office several years
after the Great Depression, as Americans clamored for strong federal intervention. He would be
associated with the end of a terrible economic crisis in the eyes of many Americans. On the other
hand, Obama took the presidency during a time when the economic crisis was just beginning.
Though the crisis began under the Bush administration, Obama would be president as the
economic crisis began to worsen and its effects, including high unemployment, began to appear
more clearly within the nation. As a result, Obama would become increasingly associated with,
and blamed for the damage that the crisis invoked. These different environments set these
presidents on two different paths. While F.D.R. was able to reject offers from the outgoing
Hoover administration to work with them, Obama was drawn into cooperating with the
unpopular Bush administration and advocated for the politically unpopular TARP, which created
an image in Americans’ minds of Obama standing with the Bush administration. Obama also
pushed the Bush administration to support and pass legislation that would lead to a U.S. auto
bailout. The bailout was another move that was unpopular with the public, who viewed it as
Obama bailing out Wall Street and leaving Main Street out to suffer. Additionally, F.D.R.
enjoyed widespread bipartisan support that allowed him to pass legislation with relative ease and
hastened the development of the New Deal, while Obama faced Republican obstructionism and
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opposition as well as a partially non-unified Democratic Party, which significantly dragged out
the passage of policies in Congress.
Skocpol also explains that when F.D.R. was president, the welfare state was far less
defined and programs, such as Social Security, were much easier to understand at their
conception by citizens. F.D.R. had the added advantage of communicating directly to the
American people without being filtered. On the other hand, Obama’s presidency took place in an
oversaturated media field where speaking through one medium would not be enough to reach a
significant amount of the American people. Obama’s comments were often misinterpreted or
taken out of context by right-wing media. The submerged state, a concept conceptualized by
Suzanne Mettler, also indicates that the welfare state and its benefits today are extremely
complicated and largely hidden or confusing to citizens. This diminished the effect of Obama’s
legislation.
The rise of the Tea Party and how it radically reshaped the GOP, causing the party to
rebound to the far right, is another factor that Skocpol attributes to the political failure of the
Obama administration. The Tea Party rose following the 2008 election, during a time where the
Republican Party lacked strong leadership and was dispirited and disappointed after McCain’s
loss to Obama. What began as a simple phrase uttered by Rick Santelli on television, quickly
became adopted by conservatives on the internet and led to the creation of a small series of
protests. These protests, which were encouraged and supported by Fox News and other
conservative networks and donors, expanded to become a loose conglomeration of grassroot
activists, Republican politicians, large conservative lobbies, and right-wing media. Tea Party
members tend to be older, white, and middle class. According to Skocpol’s study of Tea Party

17

members, many despise illegal immigration, government overreach and programs (despite using
and benefiting from Social Security and other large federal programs), and President Obama. Tea
Party members are able to keep members of the Republican Party in check because if the
politicians did not comply, they would wage a campaign against them in the next election and
endorse another candidate. This change caused members of the GOP in Congress to aim to
obstruct the president and his administration in an extremely hostile manner. Their primary
objective was to make Obama a one-term president, erase the Obama legacy, and install a GOP
president as his successor, all of which corresponded with the Tea Party’s goals.
Finally, Skocpol concludes that the presumption that the Obama administration would be
able to establish a new “New Deal” is one that is no longer possible due to the conditions facing
the administration. She implores that the president focus on preserving and institutionalizing his
legacy to protect it from attempts by Republicans to dismantle it in the future. She also predicts
that the Republican Party will continue to move towards the right, in no part because of the Tea
Party, and that they will most likely retain their control in Congress.
Historical Forces Behind the Obama Presidency
When it comes to an explanation on the paradox of the Obama administration, several
scholars have argued that the paradox was largely due to historical forces developed in American
politics and history. In Kevin M. Kruse’s and Julian E. Zelizer’s (2019) book, “Fault Lines: A
History of the U.S. since 1974,” Kruse and Zelizer examine the Obama presidency and the
results of the 2016 presidential election based on the fault lines of division : economics, race,
politics, and gender and sexuality. Through a thorough analysis of the various presidencies and
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transformative events throughout history, Kruse and Zelizer describe how these various fault
lines have divided the public.
Kruse and Zelizer examine the Obama presidency from this perspective, noting that
although Obama hoped to break these fault lines of division, he encountered a nation far more
divided than he anticipated. Racial divisions increased under the Obama administration, and
individuals attacked Obama for his race, as the first African-American president in history.
Although Obama was able to accomplish much, his efforts towards greater bipartisanship
between the two political parties and uniting the country overall were unsuccessful. Kruse and
Zelizer point at the election of Donald J. Trump, an untraditional Republican candidate who
indicates an era of even more divisive politics between the GOP and the Democratic Party. The
depth of the divisions between the American people, and the historical forces that had led up to
these divisions, would not be easily reversed.
While Doug McAdam and Karina Kloos (2014) in their book, “Deeply Divided: Racial
Politics and Social Movements in Post-War America,” also examine historical forces in Obama’s
presidency, they argue that it is another set of historical forces which has contributed to the
paradox of the Obama administration. In order to explain this phenomenon, McAdam and Kloos
present their central argument on social movement dynamics. Social movement dynamics is
described as the “dynamic interaction of social movements, parties, and governmental
institutions” (Kloos and McAdam, p. 118). McAdam and Kloos argue that social movement
dynamics have not greatly altered the general public, which remains fairly centrist, but has
shifted the political elites off-center.
McAdam and Kloos also focus on how the past of political parties has come to deeply
affect Obama’s presidency. The institutionalization of Reagan’s legacy, for example, forced each
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of his successors, including Obama, to act far more ‘Reagan-like’ than Reagan himself in office
(Kloos and McAdam, p. 210). Ultimately, McAdam and Kloos believe that Obama was able to
enact many meaningful accomplishments in his first two years, despite the obstruction of the
GOP, due to the majorities of Democrats in the House and the Senate. However, Obama’s
reelection failed to temper the extreme partisanship in Congress. McAdam and Kloos argue that
partly why Obama is a political failure is because of the polarizing racial attitudes in both parties,
and the deep level of political partisanship that has gripped the country, exemplified by the
birther conspiracy. These conspiracies arose during Obama’s election and only intensified under
the Tea Party’s rise to power, due to their primary objective of preventing Obama from winning
a second term in office. McAdam and Kloos believe that the Tea Party was most likely behind
the mid-term losses suffered by the Democratic, driven by racial resentment and fear towards
African Americans, although even without the Tea Party, the Republicans in the 112th Congress
were already determined to obstruct the Obama administration. The historic election of the first
African American president and his efforts towards bipartisanship were not enough to reverse the
course of American history and the deeply rooted attitudes that remain in America.
Both Kruse and Zelizer and McAdam and Kloos make arguments around the Obama
administration which discuss the vast historical forces present during the Obama presidency.
Obama’s election did not lead to the end of racism, nor was he able to unite the country together
or encourage as much bipartisanship in Congress as he hoped. His election alone was unable to
overcome the vast historical forces of political partisanship and gridlock he faced from the GOP.
While Kruse and Zelizer focus more on poignant events from each period of American history,
and other factors that could potentially affect the public, McAdam and Kloos focus more on how
prominent social movements interact with and change political parties and their candidates.
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Psychological Aspects of the Obama Presidency
Other analyses of the Obama paradox focus less on the historical forces behind the
Obama presidency and more on psychological aspects of the Obama administration and
President Obama himself. In “Personality and Politics: Obama For and Against Himself,”
Stephen J. Wayne (2013) seeks to break down Obama’s character and background, beliefs, and
decision-making process. Wayne traces the development of Obama’s character throughout his
childhood and teen years, where the racial discrimination that young Obama faced, the anger and
other strong emotions teenage Obama felt, and other experiences, helped him discover his roots
on his own, reinforce his racial identity, solidify his perceptions of discrimination, and place him
on the path to searching for community through means such as religion. Today, Wayne points
out that Obama appears to be more comfortable with his bi-racial heritage, as well as someone
who rarely, if ever, displays anger in public and appears to be very self-disciplined and selfconfident.
Obama’s character and background also affected his basic beliefs. Wayne categorizes
Obama’s basic beliefs in four groups: commonality as a value, church and community,
government and society, and progressive pragmatism. Obama’s first belief stemmed from his
unique childhood, and the absence of his parents, leading to the importance he places on family,
community, and country. Obama sees these communal values as what holds society together.
Obama also sees value in religion from his own experiences as a person of faith. Church and
organized religion are ways for him to connect with other people, receive moral teachings, and
provide communal values in society. Additionally, Obama’s experience as a constitutional
lawyer lead him to view government and society as a way to prevent tension between the
American people from getting out of hand. The law not only serves to maintain a peaceful
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society, but also helps secure the rights for all. Finally, Obama is a pragmatist, though this
conflicts with his self-confidence in the policy judgements he arrives at as president.
Wayne describes Obama’s decision-making process as a result of his pragmatism, in that
Obama is a “common-sense decision maker” (Wayne, p. 44) and follows a very deliberative and
specific decision-making process, where he consults and encourages debate amongst policy
experts in order to consider all sides of the debate. Obama’s experiences as a law school
professor, his success in adapting to new environments, and his self-reliance from his childhood,
also contributed to his emphasis on argumentation and collective analysis in making decisions.
Wayne addresses the Obama paradox of being a political failure and a policy success
from a psychological perspective, using five reasons to explain why Obama’s approval ratings
and support among the public decreased. The first reason is external factors beyond Obama’s
control. While many blamed his predecessor, George W. Bush, for the recession, the longer
Obama stayed in office, the greater share of the blame for the economy he received as well.
According to a Gallup poll conducted near the end of Obama’s second term in office, 64% of
Americans blamed Bush for the economic crisis, while 50% of Americans blamed Obama (Saad,
“Bush Still Leads”). Other events, such as the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico during the
Obama presidency, also decreased his approval ratings.
The second reason was muddled communications. Obama was confident in his speaking
abilities and used the bully pulpit more than any recent president, yet failed to energize his base
the way he did during his 2008 presidential campaign, due to his inability to stay focused on a
single policy issue long enough. Additionally, the issues he discussed while in office were
complex and often taken out of context by his political opponents. As a result, misinformation
ran rampant and many Americans were ill-informed about his policies and achievements.
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The third reason is news media coverage. While Obama initially received relatively
favorable coverage from the news media because of the historical significance of his election as
the first African American president, his coverage slowly became more critical as it turned
towards his job performance and policies in office, especially from conservative networks.
The fourth reason is that public perceptions of Obama’s personal characteristics shifted
dramatically during his presidency. While perceptions of Obama’s personal attributes were
relatively positive during his campaign and particularly during the time of his election,
exacerbated partisan differences in the face of Obama’s pursuance of health care reform and
other issues caused his approval ratings to decline among the general public. During election
time, the president’s approval ratings predictably increased again.
Finally, Obama planned on achieving widespread civic engagement by building a public
consensus that would pressure Washington to change its ways. He failed to do this and was
forced to involve himself in insider Washington politics and use his executive powers far more
frequently than he anticipated. Once in office, he was also forced to modify his promise of being
an extremely transparent government due to the realities of the presidency. However, Wayne
admits that even in the face of these issues, the Obama White House was able to accomplish a
significant amount of its legislative policy agenda.
Structural Aspects of the Obama Presidency
A third explanation of the Obama paradox lies in the structural aspects of the Obama
presidency. In “Overreach: Leadership in the Obama Presidency,” George C. Edwards III (2012)
examines the Obama presidency and the concept of presidential overreach, which is when
presidents engage in risky behavior by either proposing policies without popular support or
trying to create their own opportunities for change. As a result of this risk-taking, presidents
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often face severe political consequences that affect the trajectory of their presidency. Edwards’
central argument is that presidents cannot reshape the political landscape and pave the way to
change through establishing an agenda and persuading others. Of course, the president does
affect the country significantly, but successful presidents facilitate change by recognizing preexisting opportunities and knowing how to exploit them strategically. In conclusion, Edwards
believes that the Obama administration overreached by overestimating the opportunities for
change in its environment and Obama’s ability to create new opportunities. They established a
very large, liberal agenda that they could not receive sufficient public support for. Their
advocacy of unpopular policies alienated the public and directly contributed to both large
Democratic losses and large Republican gains in the 2010 midterm elections. Additionally,
Edwards believes that negative stereotypes, labels, and predispositions towards African
Americans affected Obama’s approval by the public, pointing at the fact that white conservative
Republicans overwhelmingly opposed the president, with only 11% approving Obama’s actions
(Edwards, pg. 74).
Paul Krugman, an economist who has been covering the Obama administration’s
economic policy since the beginning of his administration, advances an argument on the Obama
paradox. Krugman primarily blames Republican obstructionism in Congress for the political
failure of the Obama administration, as well as for slowing down economic recovery, which
made the public restless. As a result, many members of the public turned to Obama as a
scapegoat, who they solely blamed for the state of the economy, a narrative that was picked up
and distributed throughout the conservative media sphere.
In an Op-Ed article for the New York Times, “Obstruct and Exploit,” Krugman writes
about the Obama administration’s attempts to pass relevant economic policies and how these
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attempts were obstructed by the Republican Party. Raising the example of the American Jobs
Act that President Obama proposed in 2011, Krugman explains that the Jobs Act, despite
receiving favorable initial assessments and being projected to help many Americans get jobs,
was blocked by Republicans in Congress. It is here that Krugman points out a paradox at the
center of the Obama paradox: while Republicans point at dismal unemployment and economic
numbers and declare that the president’s policies are failures, Republicans have also prevented
Obama from even passing or implementing most of his policies. Krugman points out, like
Skocpol does, that even with a Democrat-controlled Congress, Republicans frequently obstructed
the progress of the Democrats and the Obama administration.
“The Presidency of Barack Obama: A First Historical Assessment,” a book partially
written and edited by political scientist, Julian E. Zelizer, along with contributors Eric
Rauchway, Paul Starr, Meg Jacobs, Risa Goluboff, Richard Schragger, Timothy Stewart-Winter,
Jonathan Zimmerman, Peniel E. Joseph, Thomas J. Sugrue, Matthew D. Lassiter, Sarah R.
Coleman, Jeremi Suri, Kathryn Olmsted, Jacob Dlamini, Michael Kazin, and Gary Gerstle
(2018), analyzes the structural aspects of the Obama presidency in a unique fashion. Each
contributor focuses on a different aspect of the Obama administration.
Zelizer himself begins by examining the paradox of the Obama presidency. Obama’s
victory in the 2008 election, and the seemingly ripe conditions for change when he entered
office, appeared to demonstrate the possibility of genuine change in American politics during his
presidency. Though the contributors to the book do not all agree on exactly how much change
Obama enacted, due to the variation in the issues each contributor individually covers, they do
believe that Obama was successful in enacting change in most areas. Yet, at the same time,
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Zelizer argues, the Obama administration suffered politically, since, while being an effective
policymaker, Obama was not a successful party builder. The Democratic Party suffered, which
allowed for the GOP to gain control of Congress and partially allowed Donald J. Trump, a
Republican candidate, to become president. While not all of the problems the Democratic Party
faced are directly due to Obama, some congressional Democrats have argued that Obama’s
strategies and policy choices put them at risk with voters. However, their accomplishments were
not high-profile enough for them to claim credit and reap political benefits from voters.
Additionally, the fragility of Obama’s legacy, because of his overreliance on executive power
and the design of many of his programs, will make it easier for President Trump, or future
presidents, to unravel his accomplishments.
Other contributors discuss the paradox in the context of specific issues, such as
contributor Paul Starr, who discusses Obama’s efforts concerning the economy and inequality in
his chapter, “Achievement without Credit: The Obama Presidency and Inequality.” Starr
explains the Obama paradox in that while the administration produced successful, well-reasoned
policy, they failed to dedicate enough attention and effort towards how the policy would be
publicly received. The ACA and the stimulus program are prime examples of this. The stimulus
program was effective, but many Americans were completely unaware that Obama had cut taxes.
According to public opinion polls, some thought Obama had raised taxes. Additionally, while the
ACA was less discrete, there was much public misinformation surrounding it. For instance, many
people associated the technical issues with healthcare.gov’s debut with Obamacare and many
states gave the marketplaces their own names, which caused people not to realize that it was
actually Obamacare they were benefitting from. The public distaste towards Obamacare also
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made it easier for Republicans to continue to obstruct legislative efforts to fix shortcomings of
Obamacare and vote against the policy itself repeatedly.
Other contributors, such as Gary Gerstle, point at a racial factor for Obama’s political
failure. Many were hopeful that Obama’s election indicated that America would be entering a
postracial age, but Gerstle argues that this state never manifested, and that racial nationalism
never went away. Indeed, it only became amplified under Obama’s presidency, with the birther
conspiracy, rumors that Obama was secretly a Muslim, and the rise of the Tea Party. Indeed,
Gerstle claims that it was the Tea Party’s antipathy towards Obama that led their supporters to
try to undermine and paralyze the Obama administration’s efficiency in the federal government
and succeed in costing the Democratic Party its majorities in the House and the Senate.
Edwards, Krugman, and Zelizer et al. present varying arguments regarding the paradox of
the Obama administration. While Skocpol and Zelizer et al. are similar in that they focus, at least
partially, on the failure of the Obama administration to publicize their policies and
accomplishments to the public, Edwards focuses on a completely different topic. Edwards
believes that in pursuing ACA and other policies that were not generally popular with the public,
Obama wasted political capital and overreached. The Obama administration would have
benefited more from focusing on existing opportunities and exploiting them, rather than seeking
to create new opportunities. Additionally, while Edwards, Skocpol, and Zelizer et al. all touch
upon a variety of topics regarding the Obama presidency, Krugman tends to specifically focus on
the Obama administration’s economic policies and Republican obstructionism.
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Chapter Three: Economic Policy
TARP
In 2008, President Bush passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, with the
support of president-elect Obama. Within the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act were
efforts to help Americans keep their homes through the expansion of the HOPE for Homeowners
program’s eligibility, increasing the Treasury’s capabilities, and modifying pre-existing loans
that were enacted through predatory lending practices (Davis Polk & Wardwell, “Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008”). The HOPE for Homeowners Act, which passed before
TARP, was a program that was supposed to temporarily help struggling loan borrowers by
switching their loans to more affordable mortgages that were backed by the government. TARP
expanded the program’s eligibility so that it would be able to help out more homeowners and
give lenders greater incentive to participate in this voluntary program (Davis Polk & Wardwell,
“Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008”).
Finally, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act also included a program that
President Bush would later pass down to the Obama administration: TARP (the Troubled Asset
Relief Program). TARP allocated a large amount of $700 billion to be spent by the secretary of
the treasury to help with financial pressure. The Bush administration and the Republican Party
did not consider TARP as a win, in that it went against their beliefs in financial deregulation and
subjected them to comments about how the federal government was bailing out Wall Street. As a
result, Republicans were more than happy to allow the Obama administration and the
Democratic Party take over the policy. Democrats, however, were also hesitant to accept the
credit for TARP. Lawrence Summers, former Treasury secretary, voiced his concern that even if
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the bailouts succeeded, the incoming Obama administration would face similar accusations from
the public of helping out Wall Street rather than Main Street.
Under the Bush administration, TARP allowed the government to bail-out mortgage
companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and investment bank, Bear Stearns. During the
beginning of the Obama administration, TARP was used to bailout major automobile companies
such as Ford and General Motors. The concept of a bailout, particularly for the large
corporations and institutions that many Americans felt had landed them in the Great Recession in
the first place, was particularly unpopular with all Americans. However, contrary to popular
belief, TARP significantly impacted both Wall Street and Main Street. To minimize the burden
of TARP on taxpayers, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act proposed a way to recoup
TARP’s costs. Companies that were benefiting under TARP would sell their bad assets to the
government and grant the Treasury equity warrants, which the government would later resell
back to these companies for profit. TARP also limited the amount of compensation that company
executives would receive and closed loopholes, such as golden parachutes, that would allow
executives that made bad decisions to profit even as their company suffered.
Additionally, TARP established rules and standards regarding executive compensation
and corporate governance that the financial institutions it aided had to comply by (Davis Polk &
Wardwell, “Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008”). It also set up oversight and
reporting mechanisms that resulted in greater public disclosures from corporations. However,
TARP did not solely focus on corporations and Wall Street. Embedded within TARP and the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act were provisions meant to specifically help out Main
Street. TARP acquired assets including “mortgages, mortgage-backed securities and other assets
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backed by residential real estate” (Davis Polk & Wardwell, “Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008”), and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act directed the Treasury to increase
both assistance to the homeowners of those TARP-acquired assets and the participation of these
homeowners’ lenders in programs such as HOPE. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
also allowed the Treasury to step in and prevent foreclosures through loan guarantees and credit
enhancements (Davis Polk & Wardwell, “Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008”).
While the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and TARP were originally
passed under the outgoing Bush administration, the incoming Obama administration was forced
to deal with TARP once again. As one of his first actions in office, President Obama asked
Congress to release the second half of the TARP funds, sparking massive outcry, particularly
since the administration had already faced criticism for how the first half of the TARP funds had
been handled (Edwards, pg. 82). Requesting even more funding fueled anger amongst
congressional Democrats and Republicans, who demanded that Obama be more specific about
exactly where and what the second half of the TARP funds were going towards. Democrats and
Republicans even threatened to pass a resolution blocking the disbursement of the second half of
the TARP funds, should the Obama administration fail to provide such an explanation. This
sentiment appeared to be reflected by the public, the majority of which, about 62%, believed that
Congress should not release the second half of the TARP funds until they received more
information on where the funds would go (Edwards, pg. 82). The public was also angered
because they saw this as a continuation of the bailout of Wall Street. Still, despite this,
congressional Democrats and Republicans diverged significantly in how each party voted overall
when it came to the release of the second half of the TARP funds. Most House Republicans
chose to vote to block the release of the funds, with only four out of one hundred and seventy30

eight House Republicans choosing not to vote to block the release of the funds. On the other
hand, most House Democrats chose to release the TARP funds, with only ninety-nine out of twohundred and fifty House Democrats voting to block release of TARP funds (Edwards, pg. 160).
In the end, although congressional Democrats and Republicans initially seemingly unified in
their refusal to release the second half of the TARP funds, and despite President Obama’s
compliance with their demands in providing a more detailed explanation on how and where the
funds would go, it appears that partisan affiliations played a larger role in how each party’s
members generally cast their vote in Congress. This seems to be affirmed by how Senate
Democrats and Republicans voted on the release of the TARP funds, with six Senate
Republicans voting to release the funds and nine Senate Democrats voting to block the release of
the funds. (Edwards, pg. 160). While it is unsurprising that the Democrats rallied behind
President Obama and that the Republicans opposed him, it does reflect the greater level of
political polarization that continued to develop throughout the Obama administration. Rather
than individuality of thought and opinion, it seems that both parties prefer cohesion of thought
and that partisan affiliation plays a greater role in influencing votes than other factors.
Regardless, the public was still unified in their anger and disapproval. It was from this
outrage, indeed, that CNBC journalist Rick Santelli went on a televised rant where he
specifically targeted the subject of mortgage relief, saying that it was wrong and unfair to
“subsidize the losers’ mortgages” and that all capitalists should join a “Tea Party” like revolt
(qtd. in Zelizer, pg. 33). Santelli’s words apparently struck a chord with many conservatives and
led to the creation of the powerful “Tea Party” movement that continues to push the Republican
Party to the right today. However, it was not just with conservatives that TARP was unpopular,
but with people from all kinds of different political beliefs, including liberals and moderates. In a
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2010 poll, 40% of respondents believed that banks and investment companies benefited the most
from the federal government’s financial rescue program (Edwards, pg. 83). This misperception
that the banks and investment companies were benefiting the most from financial rescue
programs, rather than themselves, further hardened the public’s anger. In February, 59% of
respondents opposed aid to U.S. banks and financial companies, even if they were struggling. By
March, the public mood appeared to have soured even more, with 41% of the public believing
that these institutions should go out of business rather than be assisted at all (Edwards, pg. 83).
To the people, the bailouts seemed like an unfair burden on themselves that was being used to
not to benefit themselves, but rather the large and corrupt corporations that had gotten them into
this mess in the first place.
Not only was TARP extraordinarily unpopular with Americans, it was also confusing and
had several other misconceptions floating around it that many Americans believed in. Due to
TARP being created during the last year of President Bush’s term, and being continued and
expanded on by President Obama, many Americans believe that TARP was passed under
President Obama rather than President Bush. According to a Pew Research Center poll
conducted in 2010, 47% of respondents incorrectly answered that Obama had passed TARP,
while only 34% of respondents correctly answered that Bush had passed TARP (“Was TARP
Passed Under Bush or Obama?”).
In her book, “Obama and America’s Political Future,” Theda Skocpol explores TARP’s
unpopularity, and the political repercussions it held for the Obama administration. Skocpol starts
with what she describes as Obama’s politically unpopular and “misguided” attempts at
collaborating with the Bush administration through sessions at the White House (Skocpol, pg.
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17). Skocpol believes that the creation of TARP, which assisted Wall Street, conflicted with
President Obama’s campaign promise of economic recovery from the bottom-up and created a
perception of Obama that contrasted from the one he cultivated on the campaign trail. To many
Americans, who were starting to face the realities of the economic recession, Obama’s actions
made him appear to be helping out the large corporations and abandoning ‘Main Street.’
In “The Presidency of Barack Obama: A First Historical Assessment,” Zelizer and his
contributors largely agree with Skocpol’s analysis on this point. However, Zelizer goes more in
depth about Republican opposition. Republicans in Congress staunchly opposed Obama’s
economic response, which they derided as virtually socialism. Zelizer points out the hypocrisy in
this statement, since much of Obama’s economic response, including TARP, was built off of
President Bush’s pre-existing policies (Zelizer, pg. 14). Additionally, Paul Starr, a contributor to
“The Presidency of Barack Obama: A First Historical Assessment,” writes how Republicans
particularly opposed President Obama’s usage of TARP funds for the auto industry bailout.
While Skocpol briefly compares the Obama and FDR administration’s handling of their
respective economic crises, her comparison lacks in one aspect. Eric Rauchway, another
contributor to “The Presidency of Barack Obama: A First Historical Assessment,” provides an
interesting and informative comparison of the Obama and FDR administration’s specific
financial rescue programs. Rauchway explains that TARP and other bailouts during the Obama
administration cost the U.S. government about 97% of GDP and 59% of private sector debt,
while the financial rescue program undertaken by FDR during his first two terms in office, the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, burdened the U.S. government with about 19% of GDP and
about 10% of private sector debt. As a result, the Obama administration undertook a financial
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rescue program that was roughly five times larger than the financial rescue program that FDR
took up during his first two terms. The RFC was also slower to act because of its usage of
gradual investments in the U.S. financial sector throughout five or so years. On the other hand,
TARP and other similar bailouts only took around two years to “reach their peak” (Rauchway,
pg. 35). Finally, despite the larger size of the financial rescue program undertaken by the Obama
administration, the U.S. economy’s recovery under FDR was much faster and outpaced the U.S.
economy’s recovery under Obama. The slowness at which the economy recovered, Rauchway
argues, affected the results of the 2016 presidential election by increasing general dissatisfaction
with the Democratic Party, due to Obama being a Democratic president, which aided
Republicans. For Obama to preserve his legacy, he would need future presidents to be committed
to preserving his policies. However, President Trump’s fixation on dismantling much of
Obama’s policy legacy shows an opposite commitment. Overall, Rauchway’s argument
converges with Skocpol’s argument that TARP hurt Obama politically through its unpopularity
with the public and contributed to the mobilization of the Tea Party, an organization that would
further increase Republican obstruction in Congress, but is more detailed than Skocpol’s
argument in shedding perspective on the comparative sizes of the financial rescue program
Obama undertook compared to FDR and addressing the implications of Obama’s financial
response to his legacy. Rauchway also extends his argument further than Skocpol in discussing
the 2016 presidential election and other future implications.
Though Skocpol’s overall argument regarding the public reaction to TARP and its
implications on Obama’s presidency provides a solid foundation that is endorsed by the other
arguments described above, it is limited by its publication date in 2012, rendering Skocpol
unable to address the progression of the economic recovery, the 2016 presidential election, and
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other crucial events, within her text. In this case, Rauchway picks up where Skocpol leaves off in
providing an explanation that, while mainly confirming Skocpol’s central points, encompasses
some of the more important implications of how the slow economic recovery contributed to the
results of the 2016 presidential election, and thus led to Obama’s failure to institutionalize his
policy legacy. By electing President Trump, Rauchway argues that Obama’s legacy is in danger
of being dismantled. Both Rauchway and Skocpol do point out one important factor, however:
TARP, and other bailouts, though necessary for the economic recovery of the country, cost
Obama his political capital. This, in turn, interfered with President Obama’s ability to
institutionalize his legacy as well. A lack of political capital, alongside increased Republican
obstruction, may have contributed to Obama’s increased reliance on executive orders, thus
making his legacy easier to dismantle and contributing to his failure to institutionalize his policy
legacy.
Stimulus
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act was a costly economic stimulus that
helped move the nation out of a deep recession. Signed into law soon after President Obama
entered office, the ARRA cost $787 billion and mainly strove to create new jobs while also
saving pre-existing jobs. ARRA provided investment and relief through funding projects in many
different areas. In the area of healthcare, for example, ARRA funded initiatives that were meant
to improve medical treatments and medical technology, and in the area of public safety, ARRA
funded a project to improve the methods put in place for treating floods and other natural
disasters. ARRA was also used to increase energy efficiency and protect the environment by
funding projects that looked for more energy efficient methods of powering every-day items,
such as streetlights. In the area of education, ARRA funding extended financial aid to low35

income college students. ARRA even provided funding to improve housing for low-income
families, all while funding many infrastructure projects throughout the country (Rauchway, pg.
40).
Though President Obama hoped to foster a spirit of bipartisanship and work closely with
Republicans in creating ARRA, his hopes were let down by the Republicans’ utter refusal to
cooperate with him. While Democrats tried to bargain with Republicans in order to find common
ground on the bill, some Republicans, including Republican chair of the House Appropriations
Committee, Jerry Lewis, reportedly refused outright to even engage in negotiations on ARRA
(Zelizer, pg. 62). Additionally, the few Republicans that were interested in working with the
Obama administration on ARRA demanded tax cuts and a smaller stimulus in exchange for their
vote, thus reducing the effectiveness of ARRA in recovering the economy. Some of these
Republicans, including Senator Charles Grassley, despite asking for and receiving their demands,
still voted against the stimulus in the end. Presenting a uniform front in opposing the stimulus
bill became an important priority for House Republicans, and this became reality when House
Republicans unanimously voted against the passage of the stimulus. In the Senate, President
Obama’s outreach efforts were more successful, but not by much. The majority of Senate
Republicans opposed the stimulus, with only three Republican Senators deciding to vote in favor
of it. However, by splitting with their party’s vote, the senators’ decisions were not received
kindly by the Republican Party. Indeed, one of the senators, Arlen Specter, switched over to the
Democratic Party after facing intense backlash. The reaction by the Republican Party, while
intense, was unsurprising, especially in light of the priorities expressed by high-ranking
Republican congresspeople such as Mitch McConnell, who said during an interview with the
National Journal that the most important priority of the Republican Party was making President
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Obama a “one-term president,” and John Boehner, who said, when asked on Obama’s agenda, he
was going to do everything to “kill it, stop it, slow it down, whatever we can” (qtd. in Barr, “The
GOP’s no-compromise pledge”). Given these priorities, it is unsurprising that a fellow
Republican voting in favor of any aspect of a proposal that Obama supported would have seemed
like a betrayal to these obstructionist goals.
Even upon its passage, Republicans criticized ARRA for spending too much for too little
result, while others criticized ARRA for not being a large enough stimulus to effectively help the
economy recover. However, ARRA made a significant impact by creating 1.6 million jobs,
helping families financially through tax cuts, providing temporary assistance to those who were
unemployed, and investing in the infrastructure of cities across the nation (Superville, “Five
years later, what did the stimulus bill accomplish?”). Additionally, during the beginning of the
recession, unemployment rates rose over 9%, though the unemployment rate gradually declined
throughout Obama’s presidency, from 9.1% in 2009 to 8.0% in 2012, at the end of his first term
in office, in part due to ARRA. During Obama’s last year in office, 2016, the unemployment rate
was at 4.8% (Bennett and Kochhar, “Two Recessions, Two Recoveries”). However, it should be
noted that the labor force participation rate, which fell to around 65.7% in 2009, has continued to
decline, or stay the same, throughout Obama’s presidency and onwards. In 2016, Obama’s last
year in office, the labor force participation rate had dropped to 62.9%. Today, the labor force
participation rate is still not as high as it was in 2009. Regardless, ARRA is often credited with
turning around the economic recession and helping the economy slowly recover afterwards.
A weakness of ARRA was that it was simply not large enough. While some economists,
such as Paul Romer, proposed a sum of about $1 trillion for the stimulus, this sum was rejected
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for being too high, not for economic purposes but for political purposes. Lawrence Summers,
head of the White House National Economic Council at the time, believed that Congress would
never approve a stimulus with that high of a figure (Zelizer, pg. 61). Skocpol also acknowledges
the perspective that the stimulus was too small in her work, pointing at economist Paul Krugman
as one such advocate of a larger stimulus. Krugman, as an economist who also covered the
Obama administration’s economic response to the Great Recession, including ARRA, offers an
important perspective on this issue. Krugman supported the bank bailouts and other measures
that the Obama administration quickly undertook in order to support the U.S. financial sector,
believing that these actions helped suppress the worse of the recession at its onset.
However, economic recovery itself took years and one key aspect behind this was the
damage inflicted on the housing market, and the dramatic drop in gross private domestic
investment which in turn, led to a decline in household wealth and a decrease in consumer
spending. Krugman uses figures from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, which reveal the
significant decline from 2006 to 2009 in residential investment, from around 6.8% to less than
3% (Krugman, “Botching the Great Recession”). These were all conditions that would lead to a
deep recession would not be easy to recover from itself. Yet Krugman believes that while
external factors may have contributed to the severity and length of the recession, the Obama
administration could have done some things differently in order to shorten the length of the
recession. For starters, Krugman believes that the stimulus was too small and only provided
short-term effects that were inadequately small for the scope of the crisis. Because the U.S.
economy stood to lose more than $2 trillion due to a decline in economic output, President
Obama’s original proposal of a $775 billion plan was already too small. This insufficient number
became further reduced in the Senate before it finally passed (Krugman, “How Did We Know
38

The Stimulus Was Too Small?”). Comparing, numerically, the size of the gap that the stimulus
was supposed to fill, and the actual size of the stimulus, makes it even more apparent that the
stimulus that we ended up with, was, by far, not enough to sufficiently patch the economic gap.
As a result, the complaint made by Republicans that ARRA was too expensive and too large
appears to be refuted by many economists, including Paul Krugman. Despite this, Republicans
and conservative media continued to bash the stimulus as wasteful and attack the Obama
administration and the Democrats for their role in passing the program. Later that year, however,
ninety-three Republicans publicly took credit for the stimulus’ spending despite their fierce
opposition to it in Congress (Edwards, pg. 212). The stimulus was one of the first, but certainly
not the last, instance of increasing Republican obstruction in Congress against the Obama
administration.
Skocpol believes that a larger stimulus package, as proposed by Krugman, Romer, and
other economists, would be unlikely to pass through Congress. The Obama administration had to
work around Republican obstructionism and proposing a number as high as $1 trillion would
never be accepted in Congress. However, she also believes that Obama was being a bit naïve in
trying to win support from Republicans in Congress, and that the move largely proved to be a
futile waste of effort, as Obama received very few Republican votes in support of the stimulus.
Skocpol chalks up Obama’s decision to reach out to the Republicans as understandable, given his
situation. It was Obama’s first term in office, and he had hoped not only for a new era of
bipartisanship in Congress, but also that the stimulus would quickly pass through Congress in
order to aid the economy. Thus, the Obama administration was constrained in their efforts to
pass a stimulus that was large enough to produce the changes they hoped to see, largely due to
Republican obstructionism.
39

Skocpol also points at a unique factor that she believes contributed to the public
unpopularity of parts of Obama’s overall economic response to the Great Recession. By enlisting
Timothy Geithner and Lawrence Summers, both of whom were connected to Wall Street, as the
leaders of his economic advisory team, Obama was often urged by them to focus on saving Wall
Street first, rather than prioritizing job creation, as some economic experts may have proposed.
Skocpol summarizes Geithner and Summers’ prescription for President Obama as “calm the
bankers, cut taxes, and quickly spend as much as Congress would enact for projects that could be
implemented without a lot of corruption or litigation, and then be patient” (Skocpol, pg. 18).
Indeed, Geithner and Summers’ influence can also be seen in the stimulus itself, where tax cuts
were added and investment “in infrastructure and green jobs” (Skocpol, pg. 18) was set aside
because it was seen as potentially requiring a lot of litigation that could hold up the passage of
the stimulus. Additionally, the bank bailouts and ‘Wall Street first’ proposal that Geithner and
Summers advised the president to undertake were fairly unpopular with the public.
Similarly to Skocpol, Krugman believes that Obama’s selection of Geithner and
Summers impeded the efficiency of the stimulus, since they were opposed to making the
stimulus large enough to effectively help the economy, and were prominent Obama
administration figures whose opinions undoubtedly influenced Obama and the actions he decided
to take. Two other factors that Krugman singles out are a lack of attention and focus on
unemployment and the unemployed in ARRA and significant Republican opposition that
restrained the president from attaining the level of government spending that was necessary to
help the economy.
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The assessment that the stimulus was not large enough was also shared by the public,
who were unimpressed by the Obama administration’s efforts. According to a CBS/New York
Times poll conducted during February 2009, 69% of respondents believed that the stimulus was
too small while only 18% thought that the stimulus was big enough (CBS News, “Poll: Public
Wary of More Bailouts”). This was especially true after the Obama administration raised hopes
by declaring an ambitious ‘recovery summer’ with ARRA that aimed to revitalize the economy
through a variety of efforts targeting unemployment, infrastructure, and other areas. White
House economic adviser, Christine Romer, provides an explanation for the public’s
disappointment: a lack of visibility. Romer believes that many of the measures in ARRA were
“unglamorous measures” that were also not easily linked to ARRA itself (Horsley, “‘Recovery
Summer’ Ends With Economic Pothole”). This ties into Skocpol’s overall argument of why
Obama was perceived as a political failure, in part due to Suzanne Mettler’s concept of the
“submerged state,” in which the subsidies, regulations, and other benefits to ordinary Americans
are largely hidden to them (Skocpol, pg. 43). Unemployment rates were still high at the time,
with about 15 million people still looking for a job at the end of ‘recovery summer’ and sharp
declines in private-sector hiring (Horsley, “‘Recovery Summer’ Ends With Economic Pothole”).
Skocpol incorporates public dissatisfaction with ARRA into her overall judgement of the
program itself. Despite ARRA’s large size, Skocpol believes that one of its largest flaws is that it
is not, first and foremost, a job creation program. It is an attempt at boosting the economy
overall, with the hope that jobs will be created as a side-effect of economic growth. However,
Skocpol acknowledges that a job creation plan would have been much harder to pass, as it would
have taken longer to devise and probably would have run into more political difficulties than
ARRA. While the Obama administration reduced the difficulties it faced in Congress by
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proposing ARRA, it would pay the price with the public. Like Krugman, Skocpol points at the
Obama administration’s emphasis on deficit reduction rather than job growth as a flaw, in that
the public did not associate the administration with job growth throughout the recession. In
addition to being underwhelmed with ARRA’s overall effects, Americans were also confused
about how it could work and were impatient. They did not want the gradual economic growth
and eventual increase in jobs that ARRA promised; they wanted to see results immediately. At
the end of the summer of 2010, Skocpol notes that the unemployment rate was still fairly high
and that economic growth had slowed down. Once again, Americans were left with the
impression that Obama had abandoned ‘Main Street’ in favor of the rich and powerful on Wall
Street.
In “Personality and Politics: Obama For and Against Himself,” Stephen J. Wayne offers
his own takes on the Obama administration’s stimulus, with an emphasis on President Obama’s
leadership abilities and his decision-making process. Despite frequently questioning and being an
active participant in meetings, Obama is keen to follow the advice of the experts, which, in this
case, are his economic advisers. His decision-making process is driven by data and other hard
information. However, he does not make decisions without consideration of other factors, such
as political considerations. In this case, Wayne describes how Obama used the urgency of the
situation as leverage to pressure Congress to act faster and took the opportunity to insert several
of his campaign priorities, such as education and healthcare, within the proposal itself. President
Obama also attempted to reach out across the aisle to Republicans, but despite making
compromises through the form of cutting back on the price tag of the stimulus, was only able to
acquire a handful of Republican votes. Overall, Wayne argues that although Obama was
reasonable, logical, and careful in how he approached and successfully passed the stimulus, the
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economic crisis was continuing to worsen, and the public was still dissatisfied. Importantly,
Wayne says that Obama’s explanations had “little effect on public perceptions and attitudes”
(Wayne, pg. 129).
Wayne’s argument appears to dismiss psychological factors as a factor that provides
relevance into how the Obama administration’s economic policy played a role in Obama’s
political failure to institutionalize his policy legacy. This is because public opinion played a
crucial role in Obama’s failure to institutionalize his policy legacy, as dissatisfaction with the
economy among the public played a part in the election of a Republican, Donald J. Trump, as the
president following Obama, and as a figure that would work to reverse Obama’s policy legacy.
While Wayne’s arguments are useful in explaining how Obama successfully passing the stimulus
through Congress, Obama’s personality and other psychological factors failed to affect public
opinion and thus fail to explain the failure of his institutionalization of his policy legacy.
While Skocpol and Krugman address Republican obstructionism as a factor that was
largely out of President Obama’s control, neither specifically addresses the strategic allocation of
Obama’s political capital as president. Rauchway and Edwards present interesting and
contrasting arguments on this. Rauchway argues that Obama did not fully expend his political
capital on the stimulus, due to Obama’s belief that his legacy would be better preserved through
taking on healthcare reform instead. Despite being given advice from Geithner to focus on
preventing a major recession, and from Romer to direct more of his attention towards jobs and
unemployment, Obama reserved his political capital to push for healthcare reform, which he
believed would better help institutionalize his policy legacy in comparison to the bailout and the
stimulus, which is why Obama did not expend the entirety of his political capital on the bailout
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and the stimulus. Edwards agrees with Rauchway, Skopcol, and Krugman that the bailouts and
the stimulus were necessary for Obama to undertake, yet politically unpopular. However,
contrary to Rauchway’s argument, Edwards believed that Obama expended most of his political
capital over the bailout and the stimulus, leaving little for Obama to dip back into for later
proposals and reforms.
Similarly to TARP, and what came to be known as the ‘bailouts,’ ARRA played a role in
Obama’s failure to institutionalize his policy legacy. However, the various arguments discussed
above can be categorized into two groups when it comes to their beliefs on exactly what kind of
role ARRA played in Obama’s failure to institutionalize his policy legacy. Edwards and Skocpol
believe that the Obama administration spent too much political capital regarding the stimulus and
bailout, which affected how and what kind of policies Obama was able to pass later on. On the
other hand, Rauchway believed that, while the Obama administration did spend political capital
in taking on the stimulus and the bailouts, Obama did not use the entirety of his resources and
political capital, due to Obama’s desire to pursue other items, such as healthcare reform, which
he believed would institutionalize his legacy. Krugman, arguably, does not fit into either of these
categories. While his argument provides valuable insight and data in regards to the economic
crisis and the reasoning behind its failures and successes, he does not offer his own argument on
the institutionalization of Obama’s policy legacy, and thus, remains uncategorized. Among all of
these arguments, however, Skocpol and Edwards may have more merit. Considering the
significant obstacles against the Obama administration, especially following the politically
unpopular decision to request the second half of the TARP funds and increasing Republican
obstructionism in Congress, President Obama was not only drawn to use the full extent of his
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political capital and resources in order to pass the stimulus, but realistically could not have done
much more under the circumstances that he was presented with.
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Chapter 4: Auto Bailout
Overview
The $17.4 billion auto bailout of large U.S. auto companies, including Chrysler and
General Motors, who were the main benefactors of the bailout, began as a temporary measure
under President George W. Bush near the end of his last term in office in 2008. The companies
had informed President Bush that they were in danger of collapsing, and that they needed help.
Their shares were falling, and they were spending cash at an unsustainable rate. With the
economic crisis and recession starting to rear its head, President Bush decided to act in order to
prevent the economy from suffering from even more devastating consequences, though he did set
several conditions for the bailout, primarily that the government would own a stake in the
companies receiving the loans and the establishment of a hard deadline for these companies to
prove their profitability and potential. If, for some reason, they were unable to prove their
profitability by that deadline, the government would be able to demand that the company return
all of the money loaned to them back to the Treasury (Allen and Rogers, “Bush announces $17.4
billion auto bailout”).
Since the funding for the auto bailout did originate from TARP, it is unsurprising that the
auto companies were also required to provide comprehensive records to the government, accept
limits on executive incomes and an elimination of certain costly perks that were typically
enjoyed by executives, as well as compliance to other restrictions and rules. However, by
announcing the bailout near the end of his presidency, President Bush not only put the
responsibility of deciding on the fate of the auto bailout on then president-elect Obama, but also
forced Obama to immediately deal with the issue of releasing the second half of the TARP funds,
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due to the fact that $4 billion of the $17.4 billion auto bailout Bush promised was contingent on
the release of the second half of the TARP funds (Allen and Rogers, “Bush announces $17.4
billion auto bailout”).
So with the fate of the auto bailout resting on the shoulders of the incoming Obama
administration, President Obama quickly made a decision once in office to not only continue, but
also expand the auto bailout, as well as add a more comprehensive list of restrictions and
conditions that the companies would have to abide by if they hoped to receive government loans,
in the hopes of helping out the struggling auto companies and restore consumer confidence in
these companies. Just months into his presidency, Obama announced that in order for the
government to give out additional loans, which General Motors, Chrysler, and other companies
needed to stay afloat, they would have to quickly and radically restructure themselves, or else
endure a controlled bankruptcy administered by the government.
Depending on the company, and the direness of their economic situation, President
Obama set varying deadlines, goals, and restrictions. General Motors, for example, was pushed
to cut their costs through ending production on unprofitable items and closing certain dealerships
and plants (History.com Editors, “President Obama announces auto industry shakeup”).
Additionally, their chief executive at the time, Rick Wagoner, was forcibly dismissed, and due to
the cutbacks described above, General Motors was forced to discuss with the United Automobile
Workers, a union, about even bigger losses on retirement benefits, wages, and other issues, much
to the union’s unhappiness (Stolberg and Vlasic, “President Gives a Short Lifeline”). On the
other hand, Chrysler, which was worse off than General Motors financially, was determined by
the administration to be too weak to survive on its own and was pushed by the Obama
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administration to quickly enter into a merger deal with Fiat to save Chrysler (History.com
Editors, “President Obama announces auto industry shakeup”). Should the companies implement
these changes, President Obama intended to give them additional billions of dollars in
government loans to further aid them. Though the bailouts were not popular with the public, and
were heavily opposed by Republicans, who argued that by bailing out companies who had made
mistakes and were now failing, the Obama administration had disrupted market capitalism by not
allowing these companies to endure the full brunt of their bad decisions, and also inadvertently
punished General Motors’ and Chrysler’s competitors who did not use the auto bailout funding
(Hartman, “What did America buy with the auto bailout”).
Other complaints included the fear that by propping up these automakers, the
government was giving these automakers greater leeway to make riskier decisions, since it might
indicate to the companies that even if they made bad decisions again, they did not need to fear
major consequences, since the government would just step in and bail them out again. However,
with an estimated three million jobs and the survival of the U.S. auto industry on the line,
President Obama’s decision to continue and expand the auto bailout was unsurprising in itself. In
the end, the auto bailout paid off by managing to avert significant catastrophe in the U.S. auto
industry, saving General Motors, Chrysler, and other automakers, while also saving thousands of
jobs in the auto industry and related industries and suppliers.
Indeed, near the end of President Obama’s second term in office, in July 2016, “U.S.
auto-manufacturing employment finally surpassed its prerecession level” (Hartman, “What did
America buy with the auto bailout, and was it worth it?”). Despite this, there were some negative
consequences of the auto bailout, namely that many U.S. automakers were forced to cut wages
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during the recession, and that the union, United Autoworkers, lost significant bargaining power
and a decline in membership. Additionally, the lower wages and wage freezes enacted during the
recession continue to endure today in certain companies (Hartman, “What did America buy with
the auto bailout”). Despite these negative consequences, it is important to note that the auto
bailout is nonetheless considered a success because it managed to advert the destruction of a
major U.S. industry. In particular, during a recession, the disastrous aftereffects from the fall of
these auto industry giants (Chrysler, General Motors, Ford, etc.) would have been amplified and
even more destructive. Millions of jobs could have been lost, worsening the recession, and many
of these jobs could never come back, limiting employment opportunities in the future and
making it harder for the country to recover from the recession. Stuck between several
unappealing options, each with their own detriments, President Obama chose the option that he
believed had the most minimal consequences and would adequately address the current crisis in
the auto industry. The auto bailout clearly had its faults, but it was necessary, and more
importantly, it worked. Although President Obama may have had success in saving the U.S. auto
industry, the auto bailout held significant negative political consequences for President Obama.
As Skocpol notes in her book, “Obama and America’s Political Future,” before Obama
officially entered the White House, he was already urging President Bush to support legislation
to establish the auto bailout in the first place. However, Skocpol sees the auto bailout as
something of a necessary evil. The auto bailout was necessary because the auto industry was a
key field that housed many American jobs, and it was clear that in states such as Michigan,
which heavily relied on the automobile industry, the industry was starting to collapse. The
bailout would prevent the unemployment rate from dramatically rising again, as well as prevent
any other possible risks that the collapse of such a large industry could partake on the already
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suffering economy. At the same time, the auto bailout proved not to be a politically popular
move for the Obama administration. Skocpol writes that many Americans thought that this was a
“selective taxpayer bailout” that only benefited the big companies rather than the people that
were actually suffering (Skocpol, p. 17).
Edwards presents an argument that mainly discusses the unpopularity of the auto bailout
with the public, and in doing so, converges with the part of Skocpol’s argument that addresses
this issue, in that the auto bailout was fairly unpopular. Edwards writes that Obama, who was
entering office at the time, was warned by his advisers that the auto bailout would probably spark
public backlash, but President Obama was confident that he would be able to explain the auto
bailout to the public. Unfortunately for President Obama, Edwards believed that his explanation,
even if it had reached the public, would not have changed many people’s minds. While the
public tends not to be very well informed on certain issues, in this case, the public seemed to
already be fairly well informed on the troubles that the auto industry was facing. According to a
Gallup Poll conducted during June 2009, which Edwards uses to support his arguments, 80% of
Americans were correct in identifying General Motors as declaring bankruptcy, 74% of
Americans were correct in identifying Chrysler as declaring bankruptcy, and 85% of Americans
were correct in identifying that Ford has not yet declared bankruptcy (Jones, “Most Disapprove
of Majority”). Additionally, looking at the same Gallup Poll, the majority of Americans, 55%,
disapprove of the government’s aid to General Motors, and the majority of Republicans and
Independents, 78% and 58%, respectively, disapprove. However, among Democrats, only a
minority, 34%, disapprove of the auto bailouts.
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Another interesting result that the Gallup poll brings up is the amount of support on the
auto bailout among different regions of the country. In every region, the majority of respondents
disapprove of government assistance to General Motors. However, in the Midwest, the area that
is central to the auto industry, the amount of approval is greater than all of the other regions, but
not by much, at 46%, and still, 50% of respondents from the Midwest do not support the auto
bailout (Jones, “Most Disapprove of Majority”). Edwards also traces the overall public support
for the auto bailout across time, using data from several polls and sources. He starts from
November 2008, where support and opposition to the bailout appears to be fairly balanced, with
47% favoring the bailout, and 49% opposing it. However, as time goes on, opposition begins to
increase. In February 2009, just a few months after November, 58% of Americans opposed any
form of aid given to auto companies in danger of collapsing, compared to 41% who supported
such aid (Edwards, pg. 89).
Meg Jacobs, a contributor to “The Presidency of Barack Obama: A First Historical
Assessment,” in her chapter, “Obama’s Fight Against Global Warming,” discusses how Obama
used the auto bailout to institutionalize his legacy on the environment. In doing so, she extends
beyond Skocpol, addressing an aspect of the auto bailout that is not covered by Skocpol’s
argument. Jacobs explains that Obama knew that he had the upper hand in this fight since the
auto makers were receiving aid from the government. As a result, Obama pushed to improve the
fuel efficiency in the auto industry through his call to increase gas mileage, which was a “major
advance since CAFE standards to improve fuel efficiency” (Zelizer, pg. 69). CAFE, or Corporate
Average Fuel Economy standards, were first created in the 1970s. The Obama administration’s
plan, which was a part of the auto bailout, was to raise CAFE standards until all new vehicles in
2025 reached 54.5 miles per gallon (Stanford Law School, “Challenging Obama-Era Fuel
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Economy Standards”). Although Jacobs argues that these were beneficial reforms, she states that
they failed to institutionalize Obama’s policy legacy in this area in the way that he wanted. These
reforms would not create as dramatic of an effect on emissions as Obama initially promised, and
because they were not “high-profile, high-stakes reforms” (Zelizer, pg. 70), the public mostly
failed to notice these efforts.
Skocpol, Edwards, and Jacobs each present their own arguments regarding the Obama
administration and the auto bailout taken under the Obama administration. However, while
Skocpol and Edwards’ arguments mostly converge in agreeing with each other that the auto
bailout proved to be politically unpopular with the Obama administration, thus affecting his
standing with the public, Edwards’ and Jacobs’ arguments slightly extend further in breadth and
subject matter than Skocpol’s arguments. Edwards addresses Obama’s overconfidence in his
abilities to reach the public and convince them of the necessity of the auto bailout, and produces
several polls and other useful pieces of data to support his assertion of the increasing
unpopularity of the auto bailout among the public. Jacobs, on the other hand, broaches the issue
of the environment, and how it was impacted by the auto bailout, which Skocpol does not
address in her arguments, as well as how Obama was able to use the auto bailout in an attempt to
secure, partially, his policy legacy on the environment. In doing so, Jacobs answers, at least
partially, the question of why Obama, who introduced sound and effective policies, failed
politically, by addressing the lack of exposure and attention from the public to his reforms. The
Trump administration’s ease in weakening the Obama administration’s reforms in this area
further lend credit to Jacobs’ argument, indicating that Obama failed to institutionalize these
policies. Skocpol and Edwards, on the other hand, agree that the auto bailout, which took place
near the beginning of President Obama’s first term in office, further served to create a conflicting
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image of the president in the eyes of the public, similarly to the TARP and the ARRA, in that it
seemed as if Obama was bailing out the large companies and leaving the regular people out to
fry.
Michigan, Ohio, and Missouri: Case Studies
What is interesting about the auto bailout and its connection with the Obama
administration is how the public perceived it. The auto bailout ensured that the hundreds of
thousands of people who were employed by Chrysler, General Motors, and their suppliers would
not lose their jobs. Yet, in those very states who were most likely to be impacted by the rise or
fall of the auto industry, and although the auto bailout saved many of their jobs, the auto bailout
remained unpopular and the expected political gains from such a maneuver failed to materialize
for President Obama and the Democratic Party. Examining the seemingly paradoxical situation
of why those who benefited from the auto bailout were so opposed to not only the bailout, but
also President Obama and the Democratic Party, can be explained by looking at several case
studies on states and cities that were positively impacted by the auto bailout and the voting
patterns and reactions of their citizens.
In “Cases in Congressional Campaigns,” David A. Dulio and John S. Klemanski examine
the results of Michigan’s 2010 7th Congressional District election. Michigan is a state that has a
large auto industry and consequently benefited from the auto bailout. Despite this, the
Democratic candidate, Mark Schauer, lost to the Republican candidate, Tim Walberg. Dulio and
Klemanski begin with a description of Michigan’s 7th Congressional District. It is a rural area,
made up of many small towns. The population is largely white, middle-class, and conservative.
The economy in the district depends on the automobile industry for most of the jobs that people
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have. Consequently, the downfall of the automobile industry impacted the district heavily,
leading to higher levels of poverty and unemployment. In this district, the approval rating for
President Obama was lower than the national average, the economy was still suffering, and many
voters consequently believed that the Democratic Party and President Obama were responsible.
Indeed, Dulio and Klemanski indicate that because Schauer voted in favor of initiatives such as
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, the American Reinvestment and
Recovery Act, and the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, it hurt his standing
with voters and was partially responsible for him losing the election.
Since the ACA and ARRA were associated with President Obama, who was unpopular
with Schauer’s constituents, and because Schauer voted in favor of these policies, he became
more unpopular as well, just by association with Obama’s policies. Though Schauer was aware
of this stigma, and was careful to vote against an increase in the debt ceiling and the release of
the second half of the TARP funds, his votes on the other policies mentioned above were enough
for voters to associate Schauer with President Obama and the “‘liberal’ agenda” (Dulio and
Klemanski, p. 263).
On the other hand, Schauer’s Republican opponent, Walberg, did not support ARRA,
Obamacare, and other similar policy initiatives, and promised to repeal Obamacare once in
Congress. Additionally, Walberg made several remarks at an event regarding the birther
conspiracy, where he suggested that he was not certain on whether or not Obama was an
American citizen, and that Obama should produce his birth certificate to Congress, or else
possibly face impeachment. However, he later retracted his remarks after drawing heavy
criticism for them. Still, Walberg succeeded in defeating Schauer, through his repeated and
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successful efforts to link Schauer with Nancy Pelosi, President Obama, and other similar
Democratic establishment figures. Walberg also benefited from a decline in Democratic voter
turnout and an increase in Republican voters. Notably, 38% of voters in the district agreed with
the Tea Party movement, and Walberg himself said that the Tea Party and their influence had
forced him to “respond to their demands” (Dulio and Klemanski, pg. 274).
This indicates that there is a partisan bias when it comes to the public’s perception of the
Obama administration’s actions and initiatives, which is further confirmed by the article, “Why
Michigan is split on the auto bailout,” written by Mark Mardell. Mardell interviewed workers at
a General Motors assembly plant in Flint, Michigan as well as a group of automobile industry
workers who were also Tea Party supporters in the neighboring city of Brighton, Michigan.
While many of the workers reported that they could feel the positive effects of the bailout on not
only saving the company and increasing profits, some workers that were interviewed did not
believe that the auto bailout was a good idea regardless. Mardell reports that these workers
disagreed with the bailout because they thought that it was unfair of the government to not bail
out other small businesses who were also in trouble. Many of these workers also held the belief
that large automobile companies, such as General Motors, should have been allowed to go
through the natural process and become bankrupt, because the company would have come back
even stronger afterwards.
This opposition to the auto bailout is not solely restricted to Michigan. People in other
states who heavily rely on the automobile industry for much of their jobs and local economy
reflect similar opinions. In the article, “Bailed Out by Obama, but Rooting for Romney,” James
B. Stewart interviewed people in the cities of Wentzville, Missouri and Lordstown, Ohio. What
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both of these cities have in common is the large General Motors’ automobile plants within their
cities that make up a significant portion of employment within both Wentzville and Lordstown.
According to Stewart, none of the residents he interviewed from both towns disputed the fact that
the auto bailout had successfully rescued General Motors. In Wentzville, General Motors was
expected to expand its plant and employ thousands of workers, and in Lordstown, General
Motors has pledged to maintain all jobs at the current plant located there, and spend millions of
dollars upgrading the plant. Stewart interviewed the mayor of Wentzville, who said that General
Motors has “already hired about 700 people” and is expected to bring “in over a thousand new
jobs” (Stewart, “Bailed Out by Obama”). In fact, many of the residents observed that after the
auto bailout and subsequent rescue of General Motors, the city in general has been thriving, with
increased business, more new restaurants and recreational facilities opening up than ever before,
a boom in the population of the city, and rises in per capita income. For small businesses in
Wentzville, they attribute their increased success to General Motors, and its newfound prosperity
due to the auto bailout, because General Motors has been supporting and working with small
businesses for supplies, food, and other items.
However, in the city of Wentzville, Mitt Romney is still predicted to win over Obama by
a large margin. During the 2012 presidential election, in St. Charles County, where Wentzville is
located within, Mitt Romney won the majority of votes, 59.7%, while Obama only won 38.7% of
the vote (Politico, “2012 Missouri Presidential Results”). Many residents are uncomfortable with
the idea of a bailout. Before the effects of the bailout were seen, residents were disappointed
because they expected to be helped, but believed that the auto bailout was simply helping the
large corporations. However, now that the positive effects of the auto bailout are on display,
residents believed that the auto bailouts helped them, though they are still concerned that the auto
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bailout did not help everyone. It is important to note, however, that even though the residents of
Wentzville understand that the auto bailout did help out themselves and their city, they do not
necessarily correlate the positive benefits of the bailout to their satisfaction with Obama. Or, in
the case of Wentzville’s mayor, Nick Guccione, who is an independent, they do not think that
one good deed is enough to convince them to vote in support of President Obama. One of the
biggest concerns expressed by the people of Wentzville, and part of the reason why many still do
not support President Obama, is because they view the bailouts as unfair to those businesses who
were not bailed out, and genuinely dislike the concept of a bailout.
On the other hand, in the city of Lordstown, which is Democratic, Obama is expected to
win the city, but its neighboring counties, who also benefit from General Motors’ recent
expansions in the area, are expected to be won by Mitt Romney. Looking at the actual results of
the 2012 presidential election, Trumbull County, which Lordstown is located within, was won by
President Obama, who received the majority of the votes, 60.2%, while Mitt Romney only won
38.0%. However, in the neighboring county of Geauga, Mitt Romney won the majority of the
votes, 60.1%, while Obama only won 38.5% of the vote there (Politico, “2012 Ohio Presidential
Results”). The mayor of Lordstown, Arno A. Hill, a retired automobile worker, claims that the
auto bailout will not be enough to gain substantial support for Obama. Like Wentzville, it is clear
to the people of Lordstown, and himself, that the auto bailout has been beneficial by bringing
many more jobs to their General Motors’ plant. Still though, many people are uncomfortable
with the idea of a bailout, falsely believing that because General Motors was rescued by a
bailout, the company will not be able to pay bonuses to workers because General Motors still
owes money to the government. Stewart clarifies this misconception, stating that at the time of
the article, General Motors had already payed back its loans to the government in full. Mayor
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Hill, who identifies as a Republican, said that he himself would be voting for Romney, mainly
because he disagreed with the concept of the bailout and believed in “less government and lower
taxes and that people should have personal responsibility” (qtd. in Stewart, “Bailed Out by
Obama”).
However, John Weaver, a political consultant interviewed by Stewart, believes that
Obama still received some sort of political gain from his actions. In states such as Michigan,
Ohio, and Missouri, all of whom were positively impacted by the auto bailout, polls suggest that
President Obama was ahead of the then Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney during
the 2012 presidential election. It appears that this perceived benefit was accurate in the states of
Michigan and Ohio, which President Obama won the majority of the popular vote. However, in
Missouri, Romney ended up winning the majority of the popular vote during the election.
Each of the ideas presented in this chapter offer an argument regarding the auto bailout.
While none of the arguments appear to conflict with one another in their statements, I believe
that they each address differing aspects of the auto bailout and its impact on the Obama
presidency, with the exception of Edwards and Skocpol, who seem to mostly converge in their
assessments that this was a politically unpopular, yet necessary move by the Obama
administration. On the other hand, Jacobs focuses on the environmental effects of the auto
bailout, which none of the other arguments address. Jacobs also explains the lack of public
attention to President Obama’s environmental reforms in the auto industry, as well as the
gradual, rather than dramatic, change resulting from these reforms. This is evidence that neatly
fits into part of the explanation of why Obama is considered a political failure: a lack of publicity
and public awareness of his actions.
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Stewart and Mardell’s articles provide an informative closeup on how the auto bailout
was perceived by the public by going out and discussing with the actual people who were
impacted by the auto bailout their thoughts. While some of their information converges with
Skocpol and Edwards’ argument, namely in that Obama is not receiving full political gains, even
from those who benefited from the auto bailout, Stewart and Mardell also extend beyond
Skocpol and Edwards on explaining why exactly these voters do not support President Obama,
or the auto bailout itself. Skocpol briefly discusses in her argument how the auto bailout
perpetuated the perception of many Americans that President Obama was helping out the big
companies and abandoning the regular people, and Edwards himself does not provide much of a
substantive discussion on why the public disliked the auto bailout, besides the fact that they just
did. However, by talking directly to the people, Stewart and Mardell are able to collect more
varied reasons, from conservative beliefs on less government intervention, to a general dislike of
bailouts.
Finally, Dulio and Klemanski, in specifically focusing on an election in Michigan’s 7th
Congressional District, offer a unique perspective on the auto bailout, in that partisan beliefs and
allegiances seemingly overrule all. The district discussed in the chapter heavily relies on the
automobile industry for jobs. Yet, both Schauer, the Democratic candidate, and Walberg, the
Republican candidate, opposed the release of the second half of the TARP funds, which
contributed funding to the auto bailout, due to the unpopularity of TARP with their constituents,
who referred to it as the Wall Street bailout. Even then, Walberg’s attacks that Schauer was in
cohorts with Obama and Pelosi, and that Schauer was somehow a part of their liberal agenda,
succeeded. Rather than rewarding the president, and his party, including Schauer, for the auto
bailout, voters seemed to reward those who were actively against the president and his party,
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including Walberg. This indicates a political failure on the part of President Obama, though
perhaps one that was unavoidable by him, given the rise of the formidable Tea Party and the
increase in enthusiastic Republican voters in elections such as Schauer vs. Walberg.
Each of these arguments differ from one another in that they each contribute valuable
information and perspectives to the discussion of the auto bailout and the paradox of the Obama
administration. Given this, as well as a lack of conflict among these arguments, there is no one
argument that clearly appears to have more merit than the others.
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Chapter Five: Obamacare
Overview
In 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act into
law. The healthcare program came to be known as the Affordable Care Act (ACA for short), or,
more popularly, “Obamacare.” Obamacare, born out of President Obama’s priority to institute
healthcare reform, was one of the most significant and lasting programs of the president’s legacy.
However, while preceding presidents, such as Bill Clinton, tried and failed to implement
healthcare reform, Obama succeeded. The program sought to help the middle class and the poor
through its three main goals: making health care insurance affordable for more people through
subsidies that lowered the costs of insurance for low-income households, expanding Medicaid
for a greater number of adults, particularly low-income ones, and supporting efforts to lower
general costs of healthcare, such as “innovative medical care delivery methods”
(HealthCare.gov, “Affordable Care Act (ACA)”).
Through its provisions, the Affordable Care Act targeted each of these three goals. The
original Affordable Care Act aimed to bring health insurance coverage to about 32 million
uninsured Americans through measures such as requiring large employers to cover their
employees’ health insurance and for individuals to have insurance. The Affordable Care Act
even had provisions to ensure that those with health insurance were able to continue their
coverage. On the goal of expanding Medicaid, Obamacare made it so that people with incomes
under 133% of the federal poverty line were covered by Medicaid. Finally, in order to lower the
overall costs of healthcare, Obamacare placed more oversight over health insurance, emphasized
preventative treatments, and worked to combat health care fraud, among other initiatives (NCSL,
“The Affordable Care Act: A Brief Summary”). Due to its advancements in the area of
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healthcare reform, Obamacare was one of the most defining domestic policies of the Obama
administration.
Looking back at Obamacare and what it has achieved today since it was passed in 2010,
it is clear that the program has come with its fair share of successes and failures. Obamacare was
able to greatly reduce the number of Americans that were uninsured, making it successful at its
first goal. This is evident by the fact that 22.3% of Americans were uninsured in 2010, while in
2016, this number dropped nearly in half, with only 12.4% of Americans still uninsured
(Abelson et al., “Obamacare Turns 10”). Obamacare’s efforts to expand healthcare coverage
enabled millions of people to have access to preventive care and improved access to health care
and coverage for people of color. From 2010 to 2016, the uninsured rate among Hispanics,
Asians, and blacks declined significantly. For Hispanics, it fell from 32.6% to 19.1%, for Asians,
it fell from 13.1% to 7.1%, and for blacks, it fell from 19.9% to 10.7% (Artiga et al., “Race and
Ethnicity Since the ACA”). On the second goal of Obamacare, which was to extend access to
Medicaid, it can be considered a partial success. Originally, Obamacare required all states to
expand Medicaid. However, a 2012 Supreme Court ruling struct down this requirement, making
it so that states had free reign on whether or not they chose to expand the program in their
respective states.
Despite this ruling, most states chose to expand the Medicaid program in their states, save
for fourteen states. The effects were significant, even if not every state participated. Between
2013 and 2019, enrollment in Medicaid increased by 34%, which is about 13 million people. The
group that was affected the most were poor adult citizens with no dependents, a category that,
prior to the Medicaid expansion under Obamacare, were typically ineligible for Medicaid. Their
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uninsured rate dropped from 45.4% in 2013 to only 16.5% in 2015 (Adelson et al., “Obamacare
Turns 10”). In several states that originally chose not to expand Medicaid, citizens are fighting to
provide Medicaid expansion through negotiations or by placing the issue on the ballot for people
to vote on. This is currently occurring in the states of Oklahoma, Missouri, and Kansas (Artiga et
al., “Race and Ethnicity Since the ACA”). Finally, on Obamacare’s third goal of reducing
healthcare costs, it appears that Obamacare initially succeeded. Soon after it was passed, insurers
began to suffer heavy losses after they were forced to offer policies to people with expensive
medical conditions without charging a much higher price. However, as time passed, the insurers
learned how to go around Obamacare and continue to profit by using measures such as raising
premiums and narrowing the number of doctors and hospitals that they covered. Additionally,
while Obamacare helped make healthcare more affordable, for many middle-class people who do
not qualify for Medicaid or federal subsidies, healthcare is still too expensive. The cost of an
average premium for a healthcare plan has continued to increase, as has the cost of prescription
drugs and deductibles. Although Obamacare was not entirely successful in accomplishing all of
its goals, it was a much-needed step in the right direction for the U.S. healthcare system.
Yet, Obamacare has not come without its controversies and consequences. Simply getting
the program passed into law was no easy feat, with Republicans in Congress repeatedly seeking
to defeat it. Even after Obamacare was passed into law, the Trump administration and
congressional Republicans have continued to focus on repealing Obamacare in the Supreme
Court and weakening it. The Trump administration has advocated for a new healthcare reform
plan that they claim will replace Obamacare. As of now, no such replacement for Obamacare has
emerged from the administration, which nevertheless, continues to attack Obamacare and its
efficiency. One of President Trump’s most notable efforts in this area was his passage of the Tax
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Cut and Reform Bill, which succeeded in weakening Obamacare by doing away with the
individual mandate portion of Obamacare. The individual mandate required all Americans to
have health insurance or else pay a penalty and was essential to Obamacare’s goal of expanding
access to health insurance across America. Recent statistics show that these attacks may be
somewhat successful; under the Trump administration, the uninsured rate, which had been
steadily declining during the Obama administration, has begun to slightly increase again. In
2018, the percent of the American population that was uninsured increased to 8.5%, compared to
the 7.9% of the population that were uninsured in the previous year. The group that has been
particularly impacted by the increase in the uninsured during the Trump administration are the
children. From 2016 to 2018, the number of uninsured children increased by more than 400,000
children (Abelson et al., “Obamacare Turns 10”). However, more research is needed to evaluate
the effect of the Trump administration and congressional Republicans on the increase of the
uninsured in America.
Public Perception and Consequences
Misinformation and confusion circled around Obamacare and its benefits, mainly due to
the program’s sheer size and complexity. Some Americans opposed the program at the
beginning, fearing that their current health care from work would be taken away or that they
would lose their Medicare or Social Security benefits. Others felt that they had earned their
current health care and did not want to pay for people who they felt had not similarly earned their
health care. Conservatives opposed Obamacare and similar measures by equating them with the
loss of their individual freedom. Some people speculated that Obamacare would wreak major
economic chaos because it was too expensive, though these fears ultimately did not come true.
Once enacted, Obamacare immediately began to positively affect Americans’ access to health
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care and health insurance. According to Paul Starr, a contributor to “The Presidency of Barack
Obama: A First Historical Assessment,” in his chapter, “Achievement without Credit: The
Obama Presidency and Inequality,” the number of uninsured Americans dropped to a historic
low and many Americans who might have previously been unable to afford to get health care
now found themselves with access to health care coverage.
Even with these numbers and results, the public perception of Obamacare was fairly
divided. According to polls conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation in June 2016, half of the
public wanted Obamacare to be scaled back or entirely repealed while the other half of the public
wanted Obamacare to be expanded or maintained (Zelizer, pg. 55). Other polls conducted
indicate that Americans were unaware of the positive effects and changes Obamacare had
brought, or even what was in Obamacare. A September 2016 survey also conducted by the
Kaiser Family Foundation revealed that only 26% of respondents correctly identified, when
asked, that the number of Americans that were uninsured was at an all-time low (Zelizer, pg. 55).
The majority of respondents, 46%, believed that the number of uninsured Americans was the
same, and 21% of respondents believed that the number of uninsured Americans was at an alltime high. Starr notes that partisan affiliation was a strong factor in an individual’s opinion on
Obamacare, especially as Republicans repeatedly sought to vote to repeal Obamacare. However,
Starr argues that Obamacare, despite being composed of “well-reasoned policy choices” (Zelizer,
pg. 56), was not implemented in a way that made it easy for the public to observe how
Obamacare affected themselves. For example, the state-based insurance marketplaces were often
given their own names by their respective states, such as “Covered California,” which led many
beneficiaries to remain unaware that Obamacare was behind these new marketplaces (Zelizer,
pg. 56). In fact, some beneficiaries thought that they were separate programs.
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Additionally, the technological glitches that impacted the operation of healthcare.gov at
the beginning were also mistakenly associated with Obamacare. These misconceptions
contributed to the unpopularity of Obamacare, which, Starr argues, held several important
political consequences for the Democratic Party. Knowing that Obamacare was not widely
supported, Republicans felt free to repeatedly vote to repeal Obamacare, obstruct any efforts to
fix shortcomings of Obamacare, and even pass an amendment restricting protections Obamacare
gave to insurers with many high-cost enrollees (Zelizer, pg. 57). Starr also notes that in 2010,
when the Democrats lost their control over Congress, they subsequently lost the ability to make
corrections to Obamacare due to the increasing obstruction from the Republicans, leading to
further public dissatisfaction.
On the other hand, in “Overreach: Leadership in the Obama Presidency,” George C.
Edwards III overarching argument on Obamacare is that it was a political failure due to several
reasons. Obama’s attempts to enact major healthcare reform through Obamacare was received
skeptically by some Americans, partially because of a lack of trust in large government programs
and the fact that, during a recession, Americans wanted the president to focus primarily on
creating new jobs, a process they did not associate with health care reform. This led to public
opposition to Obamacare. Edwards also points at the complexity of Obamacare as an issue. The
general public was left confused by Obamacare and this complexity made it easy for opponents
of Obamacare to mischaracterize certain policies within it. Edwards begins his arguments with a
comparison between Obama’s efforts to pass healthcare reform in 2009 and Clinton’s similar
efforts to pass healthcare reform in 1993, using a Pew Research Poll that compares views on
healthcare reform in 1993 and 2009. The results indicate that the Obama administration was less
advantaged than the Clinton administration when it came to public opinion. In 2009, only 41% of
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respondents believed that the health care system needed fundamental changes. On the other
hand, 55% of the public believed this to be true in 1993. Additionally, 83% of respondents
thought that it was important for health insurance to be provided to all Americans, compared to
only 75% of the respondents who felt this way in 2009 (Edwards, pg. 31). Overall, the public
during the Clinton administration appeared to be more receptive to healthcare reform than the
public during the Obama administration in several respects.
Additionally, the factors of anxiety played a role in the public’s initial negative
perception of Obamacare. Many were satisfied with their medical care, or considered it to be
adequate, and worried that government intervention might cause the quality of their health care
to decline or become more expensive. A Gallup poll conducted in July 2009 found that only 34%
of the public thought that their personal costs would increase under Obamacare and only 26%
thought that Obamacare would personally benefit themselves (Edwards, pg. 33). These numbers
would only decline in later months. While the public remained unconvinced that Obamacare
would personally benefit themselves, the majority of the public did feel that something needed to
be done in the area of health care reform, citing concerns that they might lose their insurance or
that the number of uninsured Americans would increase if the current system remained
unchanged in the future (Edwards, pg. 34). Another factor that Edwards argued played a role in
public perceptions on Obamacare was the sticker cost of Obamacare. While many Americans
believed that the U.S. health care system had many problems, few cited it as a top priority.
Indeed, those who opposed health care reform mainly cited economic reasons when asked why
they felt that way (Edwards, pg. 35). Finally, Obama was working against the natural tendency
of people to avoid loss as much as possible. President Obama’s healthcare reform proposal is an
easy target for opponents, who were able to simply stress the potential negative effects of the
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plan to increase the public’s anxiety and uncertainty towards it. Thus, upon examining public
opinion on healthcare reform, as well as the conditions under which the Obama administration
attempted to pass healthcare reform, Edward states his belief that President Obama’s lack of
broad support from the public for Obamacare will only continue. Despite President Obama’s
impressive public speaking skills, Edwards predicts that Obama will continue to have difficulty
in drumming up public support for Obamacare, even after it is passed. By looking at various
public opinion polls after Obamacare’s passage, Edwards is able to test out his idea. While
Obama had originally hoped to use public support to force Congress to push Obamacare through
quickly, his hopes were not fulfilled. In Table 3.6., on support for Obamacare, only 36% of
respondents thought that Obamacare was a good idea, while 48% of respondents thought that it
was a bad idea and 16% of respondents had no opinion or were not sure. This was in March,
around the time when Obamacare was signed into law. However, Edwards notes, public opinion
appeared to remain stable, in part due to partisanship. Republicans and Democrats reached their
opinions on the matter of Obamacare early on and appear to have consistently stuck by these
opinions throughout time. Additionally, Americans seem to focus more on the general
ideological aspects of health care reform rather than specific policies. Supporters mainly cited a
desire to expand health care coverage to the uninsured and opponents mainly cited an opposition
to increased government presence in health care. After Obamacare passed, there was still a lack
of majority support. Indeed, a Gallup poll conducted around January 2011 showed that 46% of
the public wanted their representatives in Congress to vote to repeal Obamacare while only 40%
wanted their representatives to vote to keep Obamacare (Edwards, pg. 105).
Skocpol’s argument regarding Obamacare and the public’s perceptions of it takes
elements from both Edwards and Starr, though her argument centers around how Obamacare and
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its effects were largely invisible to the public. She writes that from the start, the Obama
administration was disadvantaged in trying to make Obamacare understandable to the public.
Obamacare primarily affected institutional arrangements that were already very complex. The
actual documents encompassing Obamacare, then, were also long, complex, and composed of
many compilations of provisions. Obamacare was difficult for congresspeople to grasp and even
more impossible to explain to citizens. Long after Obama signed Obamacare into law, citizens
were still confused about what Obamacare was and whether or not it was a good or bad thing. By
acknowledging the general confusion and resulting misconceptions spread among the public,
Skocpol writes that pollsters, which often report that the majority of the public are opposed to
healthcare reform and Obamacare, are not always accurate indicators of the public’s true
opinions. Many of those who state that they are opposed do not even really understand what
Obamacare includes or does not include, which raises questions about the validity of their
opposition (Skocpol, pg. 44). In saying so, Skocpol appears to reject a part of Edwards’
arguments, which are primarily based on various polls.
Skocpol also points at the fact that many Americans, due to their confusion, were unable
to picture the long-term benefits of programs like Obamacare that would take several years to
fully take effect. The political consequences, then, for the Democratic Party and the Obama
administration, were swift and severe. They were unable to procure significant political support
and these changes led many Democrats either confused or disappointed. At the same time, the
changes were significant enough to provoke Republicans. This directly contributed to the heavy
defeat of the Democratic Party in the November 2010 election, which was worse than the typical
losses they have historically suffered (Skocpol, pg. 46).
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Out of the three arguments presented, Skocpol and Starr’s arguments are the strongest in
discussing the public’s perceptions of Obamacare. Skocpol addresses the overall factors that
contribute to these perceptions in the public, such as general confusion and an inability to
observe long-term results. While Edwards’ arguments mainly converge with Skocpol’s
argument, Edwards primarily relies on public opinion polls to make his argument. While these
polls are useful in observing how the public feels over time and on various issues, Skocpol’s
assertion that these polls are not necessarily accurate given the fact that the public may be
confused on certain issues holds merit. Starr’s arguments mostly converge with Skocpol’s
arguments as well, though Starr holds one key advantage over Skocpol. He is able to analyze the
effects of Obamacare after its passage, and goes into more detail on this topic, while Skopcol is
somewhat limited in this aspect due to the publication date of her book. However, when it
comes to overall arguments, Skocpol and Starr provide an argument that has more merit due to
the combination of Skocpol’s effective explanations on the lack of public support and Starr’s
usage of important data that helps make a better comparison between the effects of Obamacare
and the reaction of the public.
Racial Resentment and Perceptions of Obamacare
When it comes to the public’s perceptions of Obamacare, racial resentment and the issue
of race play a significant role, despite the fact that the issue of healthcare appears to be nonracial. In “Post-Racial or Most-Racial,” Michael Tesler advances an argument that racial
resentment played a strong part in how the public perceived Obamacare. His arguments are
largely based on the findings of his own experiments and other related research. There are
several factors that contributed to why racial resentment would play such a strong role in a
seemingly non-racial issue. Tesler invokes the spillover of racialization hypothesis, which is
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when an individual’s race affects the opinions people hold on not only that individual, but also
seemingly non-racial items and people that are associated with that individual. Tesler argues that
the spillover of racialization occurred during Obama’s presidency due to several reasons. For
starters, Obama took a visible position on the issue of healthcare reform that continued to be
reinforced over time due to the media’s association of Obama with Obamacare. There was also a
common misconception among the public that Obamacare would benefit black people over white
people. President Obama’s race, as a black man, acted as a racial cue that triggered this
misconception. Additionally, Tesler’s own research shows that only 2% of respondents thought
that whites would benefit more than blacks under Obamacare in November 2009, and a 2010
Associated Press/Stanford poll found that 56% of respondents thought that Obamacare would
benefit blacks over whites (Tesler, pg. 34).
Tesler also notes that health care reform has long been a priority for many Democratic
presidents, but when President Obama attempted to pass health care reform, he received a much
different response than typically experienced. The public’s response was angrier and more
emotional, which was particularly evident during the many angry town hall meetings and
protests held by the Tea Party against Obamacare (Tesler, pg. 95). Drawing upon the Clinton
administration’s similar attempt to pass health care reform in 1993 and comparing it to the
Obama administration’s attempts, Tesler uses data to show that news stories involving the words
“anger” or “angry” were five times greater in 2009-2010 than in 1993-1994. Liberal Americans
and political commentators were quick to point at Obama’s race as a driving force behind this
particularly vitriolic response from the public, and many news stories during that period of time
discussed reports of health care racism. However, Tesler writes, there were no stories about race
or racism during the Clintons’ attempts at passing health care reform legislation.
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On the other hand, President Obama himself said that he did not believe racial animus
was behind the hostility to his health care reform legislation. Instead, President Obama believed
that the media was repeatedly insinuating this narrative because race invokes powerful emotions
and attention. Republican lawmakers, who were offended that they were being implied or called
racist for their opposition to Obamacare, also rejected the claim that their opposition was because
of President Obama’s race. After describing the debate on both sides, Tesler observes that neither
side uses substantive evidence in their arguments. Instead, their evidence typically comes in the
form of personal anecdotes that they use to support their points.
In order to test whether or not Obama’s connection to the issue of health care reform
racialized the policy preferences of white Americans, Tesler uses ANES surveys. The results
show that in the pre-Obama era, from 1988-2008, there was only a modest difference between
the most racially resentful and the least racially resentful whites when it came to government
involvement in health insurance. However, in the 2012 ANES survey, the increase in the
difference between the most and least racially resentful whites and their support of government
health insurance nearly tripled (Tesler, pg. 99). Tesler also writes that in the pre-Obama era,
there was a slight positive association between racial stereotypes and support for government
medical insurance, which turned into a significant negative association during the time when
Obama entered office (Tesler, pg. 100).
Tesler also conducted an experiment in which he created three different cues: the neutral
condition, the Clinton-framed condition, and the Obama-framed condition. Respondents were
asked about whether they favored or opposed a public option for health care and were each
randomly assigned cues. Depending on the cue, the plan would be described as either a part of

72

President Clinton’s reform efforts, President Obama’s current proposals, or created by “some
people” (Tesler, pg. 105). The results of Tesler’s experiment showed that the difference between
the least to most racially resentful on support for health care reform was only 23% under the
Clinton condition, but nearly double that, 40%, for the Obama condition. Tesler concludes that
the Obama-framed questions caused racial attitudes to become more important than non-racial
considerations when it came to people’s policy preferences (Tesler, pg. 110).
Skocpol’s arguments on racial resentment and the role it played on support for
Obamacare largely centers around the Tea Party. Through her interviews with grassroot Tea
Party members, Skocpol determines that many of them acknowledge and wish to maintain the
benefits they receive from Medicare, Social Security, and similar programs. This is because Tea
Party members believe that they have earned these benefits, not through paying money, but
through their lifetimes of work and tax paying. As a result, Tea Party members are inherently
opposed to public benefits being offered to those that they think have not paid their fair share,
which they label as “freeloaders” (Tesler, pg. 57). These freeloaders include young people, racial
minorities, and immigrants. Tea Party members believe that they, and other ‘hard-working
Americans’ should not have to contribute to the benefits enjoyed by the freeloaders. Taking into
consideration this general belief expressed by Tea Party members, it is clear that they are
opposed to Obamacare because of their implicitly racial assumptions of who will truly benefit
from it, which includes racial minorities, immigrants, and others that are deemed “less worthy”
(Skocpol, pg. 59). Later on, Skocpol writes that many of the Tea Party members expressed what
they themselves call ‘hatred’ towards President Obama. She explains that this is because
President Obama represents the change that they are scared of in America. As a black man with a
‘foreign’ name and extremely high amounts of support from minorities, Tea Party members are
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not only afraid of Obama, but they are also fearful and angry that an Obama presidency means
that these minority ‘freeloaders’ will be the ones who are benefited, at their expense.
Skocpol and Tesler each pose their own arguments regarding racial resentment and
perceptions of Obamacare. Tesler’s argument, however, comes out stronger than Skocpol’s
argument, primarily because Tesler uses experiments and surveys that are representative of the
American public to determine the effect racial resentment has on public opinion regarding
Obamacare. Additionally, Tesler extends beyond Skocpol’s argument by comparing how the
issue of race affected Clinton’s efforts towards health care reform legislation and Obama’s
similar efforts. On the other hand, Skocpol’s argument is more limited in scope because it mainly
focuses on the Tea Party. Much of her information is provided from interviews that she
conducted with Tea Party members, which is a less formal source than the ones that Tesler uses.
While it is true that the Tea Party was a large source of the anger and hostility against
Obamacare, it is not as representative as Tesler’s information, which surveys a broad range of
respondents, from the most racially liberal to the most racially conservative Americans.
Additionally, Skocpol’s argument regarding this issue is not as substantive as Tesler. She
provides an overall argument on how Tea Party members behave and think, only using
Obamacare as a brief example to illustrate her point. While Skocpol’s argument is sound, it
doesn’t provide a lot of information on how these perceptions affected Obamacare specifically,
while Tesler focuses more in-depth on how racial resentment affected perceptions of Obamacare.
Because it is more thorough, detailed, and well-supported, Tesler provides a stronger overall
argument than Skocpol when it comes to explaining racial resentment and its effects on the
public perception of Obamacare.
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However, all of the arguments discussed in this chapter do contribute to the paradox of
the Obama administration. Specifically, these arguments address why Obamacare was a policy
success, yet a political failure. Starr, Edwards, and Skocpol all point at the complexity of
Obamacare and how it was implemented as an issue that prevented the public from fully
comprehending the benefits of Obamacare. Despite the Obama administration’s attempts to
further explain Obamacare to the public and clear up any misconceptions or sources of
opposition, they were unsuccessful. In this regard, Starr, Edwards, and Skocpol differ from one
another a bit in their explanation of why the Obama administration was unsuccessful in obtaining
strong public support for Obamacare. Starr cites the fact that the Democratic Party lost control of
Congress in 2010, which rendered them helpless to the barrage of attacks from the Republican
Party on Obamacare and prevented them from implementing changes to Obamacare that would
have helped address some of the concerns expressed by the public. Edwards cites a loss of
political capital due to a large and similarly unpopular effort to rescue the economy during the
beginning of Obama’s presidency, and also an aversion to risk from the public, who were
skeptical that Obamacare would live up to its hype, fearful that it might further damage the
economy, and convinced that Obamacare would not benefit themselves. Skocpol points at the
general lack of knowledge from the public on what Obamacare actually did and their inability to
see the long-term benefits of Obamacare as a primary reason for why many were left confused or
disappointed at Obamacare.
Shifting to racial resentment and the role that it played in the political failure of
Obamacare, Tesler addresses the fact that those who were more racially conservative were more
likely not to support Obamacare. Simply the name Obamacare, and its connection to President
Obama, was enough to influence some people’s policy preferences. Additionally, there was the
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wide-held misconception that blacks benefited more from Obamacare than whites. However,
Tesler only half-addresses the paradox. He focuses mostly on racial resentment and its effects on
health care reform legislation and does not address whether or not Obamacare was a policy
success. This understandable given the fact that the former is the subject of his research and his
book and the latter is not necessary for him to address for his purposes. However, Skocpol
believes that Obamacare was a political failure, particularly among Tea Party supporters. She
points at the widespread belief among Tea Party members that Obamacare benefits the
‘freeloaders,’ who are mostly described as people of color and minorities, along with their hatred
of President Obama and all that he does. While Tesler’s argument is stronger than Skocpol’s
argument when it comes to addressing racial resentment’s impact on perceptions of Obamacare,
Skocpol’s argument is stronger than Tesler’s argument when it comes to connecting racial
resentment to the overall paradox of the Obama administration.
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Chapter Six : Obama as a Party Leader
Overview
The president of the United States is often regarded as the leader of their political party in
Congress and is expected to display presidential leadership as such. During his time as president
of the United States from 2009 to 2017, Obama served as the party leader of the Democratic
Party. He leaves behind a mixed legacy for his actions under this role. Though he was popular
with Democrats during his presidency, he also led his party through tremendous losses at the
congressional, state, and local level. During the 2010 midterm elections, the Democratic Party
lost sixty-three seats in the House, causing them to lose control of the House to the Republican
Party. In the Senate, the Democratic Party had also lost seats and were now barely able to hold
onto their control. The Democratic Party’s misfortune was not just limited to Congress. Indeed,
in state legislatures across the country, the Republican Party made huge gains during the
aforementioned 2010 midterm elections, winning twenty-three gubernatorial races and
controlling thirty statehouses, while the Democratic Party suffered many losses in this area
(Skocpol, pg. 5).
Additionally, efforts from the Obama administration to help Democratic congressional
candidates win re-election or election were disappointing. Obama for America, the organization
that had helped Obama win the presidency, transitioned into Organizing for America once
Obama became president. Organizing for America was a department within the Democratic
National Committee that sought to rouse the same army of volunteers that had helped elect
Obama into the White House to also support other Democratic candidates and support the
Obama administration on their new initiatives. The level of participation in OFA was simply not
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at the same level of when it was Obama for America and many OFA-backed candidates lost their
respective elections (Edwards III, pg. 94). Democrats echoed this sentiment, with many believing
that rather than helping them with their elections, OFA instead helped the president with his
political interests (Debenedetti, “Obama’s party-building legacy splits Democrats”). Nebraska
Democratic Party Chair Jane Kleeb, when interviewed, expressed her concern that OFA was
purposely ineffective because the operatives behind it did not have any confidence in the state
parties. Kleeb accused the organization of redistributing the funding meant for state parties and
placing it instead in D.C. Due to her belief in OFA’s inefficiency during all eight years of
Obama’s presidency, Kleeb announced that she did not want OFA involved in any capacity when
it came to rebuilding Democratic state parties. Other Democrats interviewed in Debenedetti’s
article attacked Obama’s leadership of the Democratic Party. Many felt as if he did not
particularly care about the party, noting that he had failed to replace then-DNC chair Debbie
Wasserman Schultz for years, despite the controversy around her within the party. They also
expressed their belief that he had largely ignored rather than worked with state party officials and
candidates running for election. Still, other Democrats disagreed, believing that the criticism and
blame placed on OFA and President Obama for the party’s misfortune was untrue, since they
were effective and knew what they were doing. However, these Democrats were sympathetic,
describing the Democratic Party as still being in mourning over the significant political losses
that they suffered.
A point of consensus among the Democrats interviewed, however, was that President
Obama as a speaker himself is the most effective way to help them out. Many expressed their
hope that Obama will use his voice to aid them. Additionally, Obama faced several issues in
keeping together the Democratic coalition in Congress. Overtime, the Republican Party has
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become more homogenous in opinions and stances, while the Democratic Party under Obama
was ideologically split and was also divided based on regional or state differences and priorities.
Congressional Democrats ranged from liberals, to moderates, to conservatives, and even
independents, such as Senator Bernie Sanders. As a result, due to a lack of homogeneity within
the Democratic Party, President Obama found it difficult, at times, in rounding up enough
Democrats to come up with the votes necessary for new legislation.
Psychological and Structural Factors
In “Personality and Politics: Obama For and Against Himself,” Wayne utilizes a
combination of psychological and structural factors in describing Obama as a party leader.
Obama, Wayne writes, is someone who faces a struggle in his desire to act as a bold and
visionary leader, but, at the same time, seek consensus and compromise within Congress, two
conflicting characteristics. However, it is Obama’s penchant to compromise that constrains his
ability to become the leader that he wants to be. In order to pass certain legislation, Obama was
forced to make compromises with Republicans to try to win their favor and accept deals for
items that liberal Democrats would criticize him for accepting. However, Obama received little
Republican support for his legislation despite his outreach efforts. Thus, Obama greatly
depended on the support of the congressional Democrats, who also forced him to accept
compromises that he did not wish to accept at times. Wayne argues that Obama’s over
willingness to compromise damaged the “transformation leadership image” Obama wished to
project (Wayne, pg. 77). Within his party, then, Obama leans more towards consensus building
and compromise over vision. Wayne also notes that Obama’s background pushed him to create
change in the system, but despite these idealistic desires, Obama tends to be more of a
pragmatist, which constrains his idealism. He is someone who wants to play by the rules in
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achieving his goals (Wayne, pg. 76). Additionally, this characteristic ties into Obama’s tendency
for compromise. His embrace of pragmatism requires patience and compromise, resulting in
more centrist policy and incremental, rather than large, change. Obama, Wayne believes, is not a
fan of strictly abiding by his own, or his party’s ideological beliefs, and dismissing all other
perspectives and ideologies entirely. This contributes to his hesitance in sharing concrete details
on policy issues and his willingness to engage in negotiations, even if these negotiations lack
transparency or cause further delay the process (Wayne, pg. 77).
Obama has also sought to be a visionary leader, though he acts more like a director who
delegates the specifics to his staff. At the beginning of his presidential campaign, however,
Obama struggled with relinquishing control over matters and delegating more tasks to his staff
members. As president, however, he has become skilled at delegating tasks, which is necessary
given the workload and responsibilities that come with the presidency (Wayne, pg. 74). Wayne
believes that when it comes to rationality and empathy, Obama is an extremely rational person,
thanks to his good judgement and even temperament. His judgement is a result of his intellect,
legal background, and his decision-making process, which is more analytical in nature (Wayne,
pg. 78).
His temperament is typically very calm, and the president rarely gets angry or emotional
in public, save for a few occasions. When it comes to Obama’s even temperament, however,
Wayne is less decisive on how Obama came to develop it, though he has several potential factors
in mind. These factors include how Obama worked to release his anger as a teenager and as an
adult, writing his own books, Obama’s acknowledgement of political reality in that, as an
African American, appearing to be angry could cost him politically, his legal background, or
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some other personal aspect of Obama’s personality (Wayne, pg. 79). However, Obama’s even
temperament comes at a cost, appearance wise. Even when his advisors asked Obama to get
angry so that he could match the public’s level of outrage in light of certain events and
demonstrate his empathy with their emotions, Obama struggled to show genuine anger. This has
been the source of criticism and accusations that Obama is acting like an elitist and that he is
failing to express empathy with the American people. Though Obama has tried to stay in touch
outside of the White House bubble, through reading letters and emails from citizens and bringing
up personal hardships he faced, Wayne argues that in this aspect, Obama is not as warm and
emotional as some of his predecessors, such as Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton (Wayne, pg. 80).
Finally, Obama hopes to be a leader who is bold and makes a difference, but his boldness
is limited because of his caution and carefulness. The majority of his public risk-taking is with
his personal ambitions, particularly his several runs for political office. During those times,
Obama faced odds that were not particularly stacked in his favor. The candidates that he was set
up against have been more well established or favored than he was at the time, such as when he
ran against Hillary Clinton during the 2008 Democratic Party Presidential primary. However, in
office, Obama became more cautious in his announcements and policy. He is careful to avoid
specific deadlines or details when it comes to policy. He is careful to assess the consequences of
his decisions and tries to give himself some leeway in his statements, should he need to utilize it
later. At the same time, in order to energize the Democratic Party, Obama becomes bolder and
utilizes his executive powers, populist rhetoric, and actions as president (Wayne, pg. 82). In
Wayne’s description of the various leadership aspects of Obama’s personality, it appears that
President Obama is constantly struggling to embody characteristics that often contradict one
another, and, thus, switches between them depending on the situation.
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Skocpol’s assessment of Obama as a party leader moves closer to structural and
institutional factors that President Obama faced while in office rather than psychological factors.
She addresses the most prominent and grim consequences of Obama’s party leadership: the
heavy losses suffered politically by the Democratic Party as well as Obama’s failure to
encourage greater bipartisanship between the Democratic and Republican Party in Congress,
despite his repeated pledges to do so. However, for these failures, Skocpol tends to evenly shift
the blame towards Obama himself and forces that he was powerless to fight back against. She
discusses how, decades ago, Congress frequently engaged in interparty deals because the
division between the two parties was not as severe as it is today. This was because there was
quite an overlap in ideologies across party lines, with the prevalence of conservative southern
Democrats and moderate northern Republicans (Skocpol, pg. 25).
However, Skocpol says that during the 1960s, the Republican Party began its transition
towards the right and polarization continued as conservatives gravitated towards the Republican
Party and liberals gravitated towards the Democratic Party. This homogenization of ideology,
however, has pulled the Republican Party even further to the right, impacting them more than the
Democratic Party. The election of a Democratic president, Barack Obama, who promised to take
on initiatives that went against conservative beliefs, such as using federal initiatives in order to
help people who were low or middle-income, caused conservatives to become angry and riled up
in response to Obama’s campaign promises. Needless to say, President Obama was not
particularly popular with conservatives, which allowed Republicans to feel free to obstruct the
Obama administration. Republicans in Congress were able to take advantage of procedures and
rules in Congress that allowed for the minority party to obstruct the majority party’s decisionmaking.
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Skocpol lists the various stalling techniques that the Republican Party employed during
the Obama administration, which included the filibuster. Indeed, the filibuster was invoked more
times in the year 2009 alone, than during the entirety of the 1950’s (Skocpol, pg. 27). The
Republicans also called for supermajority rule on almost every issue, no matter what it was, in an
attempt to obstruct the efforts of the Democratic Party and the president. Additionally,
Republicans delayed judicial appointments, reform initiatives, and even President Obama’s
attempts at filling spots in his administration. As the minority party, Republicans also had the
advantage of possessing regular access to the media. Many derided Democratic efforts as
extremely liberal, when, in actuality, they were fairly moderate, and also blamed the Democrats
for any delays, despite being the ones causing the delays. In addition, Republican leaders would
often complain that President Obama and the Democrats were excluding them from
conversations and compromises and cry foul, all while refusing to participate in the abovementioned events. Though the Democrats were the majority party at the time and held control
over both the House and Senate, President Obama still faced issues with getting total support
from all congressional Democrats. Given the relatively homogenous nature of the Republican
Party compared to the more divided nature of the Democratic Party, Skocpol explains that issues
that invoked regional or ideological concerns would result in the loss of some Democratic votes
in Congress. For example, when environmental measures were proposed, Democrats coming
from states where coal is an important part of the economy would often be hesitant to vote in
favor of these measures (Skocpol, pg. 28).
Thus, Skocpol turns towards a discussion of how President Obama, as a leader, acted in
confronting the division within his party. President Obama knew that the 111th Congress gave
him the greatest chance of passing through major legislative reforms, since the Democratic Party
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was the majority party and he was still in the honeymoon phase of his presidency. In order to
surpass the obstruction from the Republican Party, however, he needed his party to vote together.
As a result, President Obama spent a large amount of time working with Democratic
congressional leaders, assembling fragile coalitions that shifted from issue to issue, and making
compromises on legislation with certain Democrats to reassure them that their priorities were
being met. This slowed down action significantly. To the public, Obama seemed to be an
incapable and ineffective party leader, one who was unable to squash quarrels within his own
party and force them to vote the way he wanted. Additionally, the Democratic Party and Obama,
as a whole, appeared to be responsible for the partisanship (Skocpol, pg. 30).
What the public did not see, however, Skocpol observes, was the long-term trends of
ideologically aligned extreme partisanship in U.S. politics that had accumulated over the years
and the rules within Congress that allowed for Republicans to delay and obstruct in almost every
way. By simply being a Democratic president, Obama was never going to be able to get the
bipartisanship that he wanted. However, he was also going to struggle with uniting his party and
getting them to vote as a collective, unwavering unit, because of how different the party itself
was. Members of the Democratic Party were not going to align themselves with the president
simply because he was a Democrat. They wanted their interests represented and this required
significant compromise from Obama and the White House (Skocpol, pg. 29).
However, Skocpol also assesses Obama’s leadership based on factors that are not so out
of his control. Namely, Skocpol focuses on Obama’s preference of not taking a strong stance on
policy issues or speaking on policy specifics, instead leaving the details to legislators to create
bills. This hurt the Democratic Party, particularly when it came to its grassroots organizers, such
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as Organizing for America, because these groups did not have sufficient information to inform
people on what they were fighting for due to the vagueness of Obama’s stance. Grassroots
organizations make up a huge part of political parties and their base, so to become virtually
neglected and unaware of what exactly the president’s stance on issues were was not ideal. In
addition, Skocpol argues that shifting Organizing for America into an official part of the
Democratic National Committee hurt the efficiency of these organizations because grassroots
organization works better when it is “spontaneous” and “loosely linked to official institutions”
(Skocpol, pg. 32) such as the DNC.
Skocpol also explains a common criticism of the communication strategy Obama
employed while in office. On issues such as healthcare reform, of which Obama highly
prioritized, Obama gave many lengthy speeches, clarifying matters around it, and successfully
orchestrated forums and other events that were meant to discuss the issue. His work in
advocating for healthcare reform and Obamacare, Skocpol writes, is a good example of Obama’s
leadership. However, when it came to other issues that were not as prioritized for him, but were
impactful for the Democratic Party, Obama noticeably fell short. Skocpol notes that from 2009
and onwards, Obama did not participate in televised public explanations about the stimulus and
how it differed from the bailouts (Skocpol, pg. 35). Rather than talk more about the issues that
concerned Americans, such as economic growth and job creation, Obama instead talked more
about the federal budget deficit. While also an important issue, it was not an issue that attracted
the attention of Americans as much as the former issue did. Though Obama did deliver speeches
across the country about economic progress and plans, the fractured nature of these speeches,
which were often tailored to the regions Obama was visiting, did not result in a coherent and
unified economic plan. Only after the Democrats suffered significant political losses in the
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midterm election of 2010 and the GOP became much stronger, did Obama deliver the unified
vision that the people wanted during his State of the Union address in 2011 and pivot towards
promoting the American Jobs Act. Skocpol indicates that the positive response from the public
following these shifts show that perhaps Obama should have focused more on these topics earlier
in order to benefit his party as a whole (Skocpol, pg. 38).
In Kruse and Zelizer’s book, “Fault Lines: A History of the United States Since 1974,”
they address Obama’s intentions as party leader, which he expressed to the Democratic Party.
Coming into the presidency, Kruse and Zelizer describe Obama as being optimistic that he would
be able to create a new “postpartisan era” (Kruse and Zelizer, pg. 295). This enthusiasm was not
returned, however. Legislators in both parties found that there was little incentive for them to
reach across the table and engage in more bipartisan efforts, thanks to gerrymandering, which
produced more politically homogenous districts. In addition, the media also played a part by
developing “political echo chambers” (Kruse and Zelizer, pg. 296) that shielded congresspeople
from interacting with those who hold different ideological beliefs from their own. When Obama
met with the Democratic caucus in December 2008, he reaffirmed his commitment to greater
bipartisanship and civility among the two political parties. He also expressed his desire for
Democrats to reach out beyond the party lines and work with Republicans on legislation.
Democratic leaders were, to say the least, skeptical of these claims. They assumed that the
president simply did not understand how much the two political parties had come to hate one
another (Kruse and Zelizer, pg. 296). Republicans also waved away the president’s claims of
bipartisanship as simply empty rhetoric. Even before his presidency had officially started,
Obama’s goals for the Democratic Party, as their leader, were already being dismissed by his
own party. Kruse and Zelizer go on to discuss how the initial skepticism from both parties did
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not turn out to be overly cynical. Indeed, despite Obama’s attempts at reaching out across the
aisle, the Republicans had virtually no interest in bipartisanship and Obama struggled to receive
any Republican support on any piece of legislation. Indeed, by trying so hard to win the support
of the Republican Party, Obama alienated some of the liberals in his own political party. He
struck down liberal proposals from the stimulus bill to try to win Republican votes. In the end,
these efforts failed and liberals complained that by factoring in political concerns and removing
these proposals, the overall strength of the bill was greatly diminished. Here, Kruse and Zelizer
take a direct quote from Republican Senator George Voinovich of Ohio to summarize how
congressional Republicans responded to President Obama’s actions: “If he was for it, we had to
be against it” (qtd. in Kruse and Zelizer, pg. 298).
Meanwhile, congressional Democrats began to realize that their assumptions were right
in that President Obama had failed to develop greater bipartisanship in Congress. Republicans
realized that they had the upper hand in this situation. Obama had already, publicly, both during
his campaign and as president, promised to usher in bipartisanship. By simply refusing to
cooperate with the Democrats, Republicans realized, they could cause Obama to break his
promise to the people and his own political party. Republicans were not exactly shy about their
intent, either. For example, Democratic Congressman David Obey of Wisconsin had set up a
meeting with his Republican counterpart, Congressman Jerry Lewis of California, to try to ask
Lewis what the Republicans wanted to include in the stimulus bill. However, when they arrived
at the meeting, Lewis refused to discuss these matters with Obey, citing orders from Republican
leadership that no matter what Democrats did, they were not allowed to help them. Lewis openly
confirmed this story when asked by reporters. The Republicans held good on their promise when
it came to the stimulus bill. Not a single Republican in the House voted in favor of it. Republican
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Congressman Tom Cole explained that the Republican Party wanted the media to pick up a
talking point when it came to their stimulus, namely that “the only thing bipartisan was the
opposition” (qtd. in Kruse and Zelizer, pg. 298). Given the many anecdotes that Kruse and
Zelizer provide regarding the Republicans’ determination to oppose President Obama’s efforts
towards bipartisanship no matter what, it is clear that they do not blame the president for the
failure of his futile outreach efforts to the other side. However, as the leader of the Democratic
Party, they do seem to highlight how President Obama continued to pursue bipartisanship, even
when his own party believed that it was not possible. Indeed, these efforts resulted in the
omittance of items in the final stimulus bill that liberals had advocated for, thus hurting his own
party and benefiting the Republican Party, despite their obstruction.
Michael Kazin, a contributor to “The Presidency of Barack Obama: A First Historical
Assessment,” in his chapter, “Criticize and Thrive: The American Left in the Obama Years” also
discusses Obama’s actions as the leader of the Democratic Party and how he was perceived by
Democrats. Kazin describes the initial disappointment among liberals with Obama’s actions,
namely his appointment of Wall Street insiders, such as Lawrence Summers, and the fact that he
had not yet broken up the banks and insurance companies they blamed the recession on. They
claimed that he was not liberal enough. Kazin addresses the accusations from the left by saying
that many on the left did not have an accurate or realistic perception of Obama himself and what
he could have done under the conditions he was placed into (Zelizer, pg. 249).
Kazin explains that those on the left who saw Obama as the next FDR and someone who
would create the new “New Deal” held an inaccurate perception of Obama as a person. Here,
Kazin briefly touches upon personality characteristics that Obama held that conflicted with the
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image described above. For starters, Obama was a pragmatist who did not believe in large
changes, but rather the idea that patience and careful deliberation would eventually create a lot of
change (Zelizer, pg. 249). Rather than being vocal and outspoken against all who opposed him,
like some liberals believed he would be, Obama reached for bipartisanship. Kazin looks towards
Obama’s past to explain his attitude in this area. As a community organizer in Chicago, Obama
learned to work with various groups and help them discover their similarities. Then, during the
2004 keynote speech at the Democratic Convention that helped bring Obama under the national
spotlight, Obama spoke of a single, unified United States of America (Zelizer, pg. 249). Kazin
does offer a small criticism towards Obama’s leadership, however, in that Kazin believed that
Obama focused too much on consensus-building, a practice that would never work under the
current political climate in Congress.
Despite this criticism, Kazin argues that Obama’s critics on the left also ignored the many
obstacles Obama faced that constrained the role he was able to play, such as the fact that Obama
had entered the presidency as the recession’s effects began to truly emerge, and that, over time,
Obama would become associated with a recession that had not begun under his presidency.
Kazin even uses the words of Theda Skocpol, in which she critiques Obama’s failure during his
first two years in office to engage in high profile leadership, to describe one of his other critiques
of Obama as a party leader (Zelizer, pg. 250). Kazin points at OFA as a prominent example of
how the young, multicultural base that had helped elect Obama to office was not used as
effectively as it had been used during the election, and failed to be successfully utilized against
the Republican Party.
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Doug McAdam and Karina Kloos differ from the other arguments in that they do not
provide an argument that specifically addresses Obama’s role as a leader. However, what they do
provide is an explanation of the various historical factors that led to the development of the
current state of American politics, of which has hindered Obama’s ability to act as a unifying
leader of America. McAdam and Kloos attribute the atmosphere of intense political polarization
as one that was started by social movements. Specifically, the civil rights movement and the
powerful countermovement to it, which is known as white resistance or white backlash. These
two movements pitted Americans against one another, and forced American political parties to
begin a shift away from appealing to the median voter and a shift towards appealing to the voters
that were at their “ideological margins” (McAdam and Kloos, pg. 11). This is valuable insight
that helps shed more clarity into the political environment Obama was forced to work under, one
with increasing political polarization that made it difficult for him to serve as an effective and
strong party leader and leader of the people.
Despite this shift, McAdam and Kloos argue that most Americans have not become
increasingly polarized, pointing at how measures of mass polarization over time, such as ANES
results, have consistently shown that people generally respond with “moderate, centrist positions
over more extreme responses” (Kloos and McAdam, pg. 12). Rather, McAdam and Kloos argue
that it is political elites who have become so polarized. There is one area, however, where they
have noticed a significant shift among the public. Over time, the public has increasingly
distrusted the government and government officials. This distrust only grew further during the
Obama administration, where, in 2012, only 24% of respondents said that they trusted the
government (Kloos and McAdam, pg. 15). Kloos and McAdam describe how this perception
among the public was unsurprising, given the rather public nature of the partisan gridlock
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between both parties in Congress, delaying action. Based on these facts, it is clear to see the
relevance of Kloos and McAdam’s historical explanation on Obama’s performance as a party
leader. He was forced to deal with increasing polarization due to a historical trend in American
politics that originated prior to his presidency. This polarization, in turn, prevented the president
and his party to quickly and efficiently pass the legislation they wanted and presented an image
of disunity and division among both political parties in Congress. As a result, this created a
negative perception of Obama’s abilities as a party leader to keep his party in line and get them
to work.
Skocpol, Kazin, Wayne, Kruse and Zelizer, and McAdam and Kloos, each discuss and
assess Obama’s behavior as the leader of the Democratic Party. Wayne and Kazin are similar in
that they both touch upon personality aspects when it comes to assessing Obama’s leadership and
his actions in office. Wayne, however, goes into more depth about Obama’s general tendencies
when it comes to his personality, such as his focus on rationality over empathy. Additionally,
Wayne breaks down Obama’s personality into categories based off of his respective personality
aspects. His writing may refer to structural factors, but they are organized and centered around
personality factors. On the other hand, Kazin, while focusing briefly on personality aspects, uses
the remainder of his writing to more so focus on the different types of liberals in America and
their contrasting expectations of President Obama compared to the reality.
Skocpol’s assessment of Obama’s leadership, particularly within the Democratic Party,
stands out because of its critical nature. While her overall comments on Obama’s first term as
president are generally positive, this is one of the few areas where Skocpol expresses her own
discontent with President Obama in this regard. Skocpol lambasts how Obama publicly pursued
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healthcare reform over job creation and the economy, key issues that the public was more
concerned about at the time. She also believes that he was not public enough on these issues,
which could have helped his party, and criticizes his timing in speaking up on these issues only
after his party had suffered devastating political losses. Indeed, Skocpol, who wrote her book
prior to the 2012 election, writes that if President Obama lost his re-election bid, one of the
major reasons for his loss would be his lack of high-profile leadership in this regard. However,
Skocpol does not believe that Obama is solely to blame for the suffering that the Democratic
Party endured politically. She acknowledges the many factors that were largely out of Obama’s
hands in her argument as well. Her overall assessment of Obama’s party leadership, then, is a
mixed bag of negative and neutral comments. In this regard, Skocpol, Wayne, Kazin, and Kruse
and Zelizer offer extremely similar assessments of Obama as a party leader. Their arguments
contribute to the Obama paradox by taking into consideration the historical factors and overall
trends in U.S. politics that Obama was powerless to counter, yet still affected his leadership
capabilities, and, at the same time, addressing Obama’s failure to prioritize his party over his
own policy goals, his lack of action within state parties, and his bad timing when it came to
addressing certain issues, among other critiques. This helps explain a portion of the Obama
paradox, regarding the perception of Obama as a political failure, by showing that the
culmination of the factors described above resulted in negative political consequences. The
devastating political losses suffered by the Democratic Party led to the creation of an image of
President Obama as being unable to control his divided and weaker party. While the arguments
may offer some differing evidence or anecdotes, their main message is mainly the same and there
is significant overlap between them all. Skocpol, Kazin, and Wayne, however, approach the
subject with more general statements and facts, while Kruse and Zelizer rely much more heavily
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on anecdotes, quotes, and stories to illustrate their points. One common example that all of the
arguments, save for Kruse and Zelizer, emphasize when assessing Obama’s leadership, however,
is OFA (Organizing for America). Skocpol and Kazin point at the administration’s failure to
fully or correctly utilize OFA and its members, which had been active politically and helped
elect Obama into office, against the Republican Party. Wayne takes a slightly different approach,
in that he discusses Obama’s belief in participatory politics and his attempt to use OFA to try to
help him govern due to his belief that the members of OFA would be key to his success. In the
end, however, Wayne acknowledges OFA’s failure to “energize his [Obama’s] base” (Wayne,
pg. 112) the same way it had during his campaign for president. Ultimately, Wayne, Skocpol,
and Kazin all agree that OFA did not live up to its potential. McAdam and Kloos also break from
the other arguments in how they do not directly address the issue of Obama’s party leadership,
but rather provide some much-needed historical background on the issue itself. This information
helps clarify the underlying challenges to Obama’s leadership that he was powerless to counter.
However, the evidence presented by McAdam and Kloos supports the conclusions similarly
drawn by the other scholars described within this chapter.
While there is significant overlap and repetition between all of the arguments, Wayne’s
argument addresses Obama’s personal qualities when describing his leadership, causing his
argument to differentiate itself from the other arguments in this regard. While acknowledging
the same structural factors that constrained President Obama, and using real-life events in order
to support his points, Wayne branches out further than the other arguments in discussing Obama
as a person, and dissecting the aspects of his personality that affect his capabilities as the leader
of the Democratic Party. In addition, though there were many psychological and structural
factors used to assess Obama’s performance as party leader, Wayne’s argument brings to
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attention one particularly important psychological factor: indecisiveness. Obama’s constant
internal struggle between various characteristics he wishes to embody, such as choosing idealism
versus pragmatism, or being a cautious leader versus a bold leader, is one that accounts for much
of the decisions Obama has made as party leader. This factor offers an interesting and useful
perspective that is either untouched or barely touched by the other arguments.
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Chapter Seven : Conclusion
Overview
During President Obama’s two terms in office from 2009 to 2017, he left behind a
paradoxical legacy, one defined by his many political failures, such as the severe political losses
the Democratic Party suffered, policies that were not well-publicized, and the election of his
successor, Donald Trump, a man who sought to destroy his legacy, and began to do so once in
office. However, President Obama will also be remembered for his many policy successes. These
include Obamacare, a successful attempt to institute healthcare reform despite the failures of
previous Democratic presidents to do the same. Additionally, the stimulus and other similar
measures Obama pushed through Congress rescued the automobile industry and helped keep a
country deep into a recession afloat. Finally, President Obama is known for his work in many
areas, including the environment, education and LGBTQ+ rights-all accomplishments made even
more impressive due to the existence of an obstructive Republican Party and the rise of
opposition movements such as the Tea Party.
Although the nature of the paradox is quite well established, the specific explanations and
evidence that scholars have adopted to explain the paradox vary. Given the broad range of
literature on this topic, my goal throughout the duration of this project was to examine the
quality of these arguments when compared to one another. I focused on Theda Skocpol’s
argument in particular and contrasted her argument with that of other scholars. By summarizing
their arguments, comparing and contrasting them to one another, and supplementing their
arguments with a broad range of other resources, from polls to news articles, I was able to clearly
identify the strengths and weaknesses of each argument and form an opinion on the strength of
Skocpol’s argument overall.
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This research holds significance because the Obama paradox is not just a relic from a
previous presidency. It is very much alive today, and I believe that the substantial amount of
literature regarding this topic supports its relevance to American politics today. Currently, the
results of the 2020 election are unknown, but the implications of this result are enormous for the
existence of the Obama paradox. One candidate, Donald J. Trump, stands for the continuation of
the destruction of President Obama’s legacy. The other candidate, Joseph R. Biden Jr., stands for
the continued protection of President Obama’s legacy. In more ways than one, this election very
much determines the future of the Obama paradox and the nature of its influence in future
presidencies.
Final Thoughts
Overall, Skocpol’s argument regarding the Obama paradox is one that I would consider
as capable of describing the paradox itself and across several areas. At the same time, the
strength of this argument suffers from several major limitations. Namely, the publication date of
her book in 2012 immensely holds her back from offering a more detailed and relevant argument
in several areas since her argument fails to cover President Obama’s second term in office and
major events such as the 2016 election, among others. In addition, the length of her argument,
around ninety pages, is enough to provide a summary that will allow readers to have a good
grasp on the Obama paradox, but its length constrains its ability to be more specific, resulting in
several areas that could have been strengthened with further elaboration. Given these limitations,
I propose that Skocpol’s argument does adequately address all four areas and her summary of the
paradox remains valuable throughout time. However, it should be supplemented with more
current texts, such as “The Presidency of Barack Obama: A First Historical Assessment.” In
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addition, each of the other texts compared to Skocpol in this thesis should also be referred upon
to provide further detail and specifics.
Finally, Skocpol fails to place the political failure of the Democratic Party in context of
the pro-GOP bias of the Electoral College. Examining every presidential election since the year
2000, Democrats have won the presidency three times and Republicans have won the presidency
three times as well. However, for each election besides 2004, Democrats have won the popular
vote, while the Republicans have only won the popular vote once (Leip, Dave Leip’s Atlas of
U.S. Presidential Elections). During the 2000 and 2016 presidential election, which were won by
the Republican presidential candidates, they did not receive the majority of the popular vote, yet
were still able to win the presidency in both cases (Leip, Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential
Elections).
However, this data does not make the Obama paradox itself obsolete, regarding the
political failure aspect of it, since each time that the Democrats won the popular vote, it was
fairly slim. Nonetheless, it does show that the political failure of the Democratic Party cannot be
entirely attributed to the public’s personal opinion regarding Democratic candidates, policies, or
both. For example, the election of President Trump as Obama’s successor in office is often
referenced as a key example of the political failure that is part of the Obama paradox. However,
Hillary Clinton, the Democratic presidential candidate, won the popular vote during that election.
As a result, the political failure of the Democratic Party in 2016 cannot be entirely attributed to a
rebuke of the public to the Obama presidency, considering the Electoral College’s impact on
determining the results of the presidential election. Yet, the pattern of the pro-GOP bias of the
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Electoral College has been evident since the 2000 presidential election, and Skocpol’s book was
published in 2012, meaning that she could have discussed this issue in her writing.
Within the ever-evolving world of American politics, the Obama paradox cannot be
captured in its entirety by one argument alone. Rather, the attempt to further define and explain
this paradox is a constant process of accumulating new knowledge and insight from researchers
and scholars just like Skocpol.
Further Study
The relevance of the Obama paradox to American politics today creates a wealth of areas
for potential further study. Potential researchers could study the implications or the actual impact
that the Obama paradox carries on modern American politics. Of course, the majority of this
research would be dependent on the results of the 2020 election. Should President Trump win the
election, an examination of his role on the Obama paradox and its evolution during his first and
potentially second term in office would be interesting. President Trump has been determined to
erase Obama’s legacy completely, and it would be curious to see if his resolve continues during
his second term in office or if his priorities will shift away from this area. However, I anticipate
that President Trump will continue to prioritize the destruction of Obama’s presidential legacy
should he be re-elected, especially considering his recent battles to get rid of Obamacare entirely.
On the other hand, should Joseph R. Biden Jr., Obama’s former vice president, win the
election and serve his first term in office, an interesting area of study could be on how Biden
continues the Obama paradox as president himself. Biden makes an especially intriguing
candidate for research in this regard, considering his experience as Obama’s vice president and
the fact that Biden will enter office under similar conditions to Obama. The country is reeling
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from the Covid-19 pandemic, which led to severe economic repercussions as businesses were
forced to shut down for prolonged periods of time and as certain industries have yet to fully
recover. Should Biden win the presidency, he will enter his first term in office during a period of
economic distress in America, similarly to Obama. According to his advisers, the former vice
president is aware of these similarities and apparently aims to quickly take action on the
economy (Irwin, “How Failures of the Obama-Era Stimulus Could Guide a Biden
Administration). Still, comparing the actual decisions that President Biden makes once in office
in comparison to President Obama, and observing whether or not the Biden administration
avoids the errors of the Obama administration, would greatly add onto an explanation of the
current state of the Obama paradox.
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